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INTRODUCTION

The New Jersey Capital Punishment Act 1 provides for
mandatory appeal to the state supreme court and, in the event the
appeal results in the affirmance of the conviction and death sentence, what has become known as "proportionality review." Specifically, the NewJersey Criminal Code, section 2C:11-3e, as currently
written, states:
Every judgment of conviction which results in a sentence of
death under this section shall be appealed, pursuant to the
Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. Upon the request of the
defendant, the Supreme Court shall also determine whether the
sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. Proportionality review under this section shall be limited to a comparison of similar cases in which a death sentence has been imposed
under subsection c. of this section. In any instance in which the
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defendant fails, or refuses to appeal, the appeal shall be taken
by the Office of the Public Defender or other
counsel appointed
2
by the Supreme Court for that purpose.
In inquiring "whether the sentence is disproportionate to the
penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and
the defendant," the proportionality review mandated by the Act
does not inquire whether the particular category of crimes, or of
offenders, may appropriately be subjected to the death penalty.3
The review does not address such issues as, for example, whether
the death penalty may be imposed for rape,4 or whether one may
be executed for aiding and abetting a felony in which an unforeseen murder is committed by another.5 Nor does it inquire
2 As originally enacted, the NewJersey Criminal Code did not list capital punish-

ment as a sentencing option. See JOHN M. CANNEL, TITLE 2C, NEW JERSEY CRIMINAL
CODE ANNOTATED, Comment 1 to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3, at 245 (West 1995).
Death penalty provisions were added by L. 1982, c. 111, effective August 6, 1982. See
id. This amendment provided for both appellate and proportionality review of capital
sentences. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:11-3c, e (West 1995). Initially, the Act mandated
proportionality review in all cases in which the death sentence was imposed. The
state legislature twice amended subsection e, which provides for proportionality review; initially in 1985 and once again in 1992. First, L. 1985 c. 178, made proportionality review optional at the request of the defendant, rather than mandatory in every
case. CANNEL, supra, at 246; Hearings on A. 4316 (Proportionality Review) Before the
Assembly Judiciary, Law & Public Safety Committee, 2 (Jan. 31, 1991) (Statement of
Attorney General Robert J. Del Tufo) (hereinafter "Hearings"). The subsection was
again amended by L. 1985, c. 478, to require that there be an appeal in every deathsentenced case, whether desired by the defendant or not. CANNEL, supra, at 246. The
section was amended further by L. 1992, c. 5, which limited the universe of cases to be
used in conducting the proportionality review to "similar cases in which a sentence of
death has been imposed." See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3e (West 1995); CANNEL, SUpra,
at 246.
3 See generally Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43 (1984); State v. Marshall, 130 N.J.
109, 127-31, 613 A.2d 1059, 1067-69 (1992).
4 Coker v.Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) ("We have concluded that a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of
rape and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual
punishment.").
5 See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800-01 (1982) (imposition of death penalty
on one who aids and abets felony in course of which murder is committed by others,
but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill, violates Eighth Amendment). But see Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1987) (death penalty for felony
murder held constitutional for persons who do not kill or intend to kill, but who have
major personal involvement in felony and show reckless indifference to human life).
In State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 549 A.2d 792 (1988), the New Jersey Supreme Court
rejected Tison and held that the NewJersey Constitution does not permit the imposition of the death penalty unless the defendant purposefully or knowingly caused
death; the mere intent to cause serious bodily injury, which results in death, the Court
held, could not constitutionally justify the death penalty. See generally 113 NJ. at 6992, 549 A.2d at 806-25. This holding, which was the cause of a long string of reversals
of death sentences, was subsequently overruled when the NewJersey Constitution was
amended to provide that "[it shall not be cruel and unusual punishment to impose
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whether certain classes of offenders, such as minors6 or mentally
retarded persons,7 may be executed consistent with the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clauses of the Constitutions of the United
States8 and New Jersey.9 The resolution of any of these critical
questions requires a careful, jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction analysis of
whether the death penalty is "firmly rejected" for a category of
crimes or a class of offenders.'" Rather, the proportionality review
the death penalty on a person convicted of ... purposefully or knowingly causing
serious bodily injury resulting in death.. ."). N.J. CONST. art. I, 12. Thereafter, in
L. 1993, c. 111, the legislature amended the statute to define murder as purposefully
or knowingly causing "death or serious bodily injury resulting in death." See N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:11-3a(1)-(2) (West 1995).
6 See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 815 (1988); State v. Bey (I), 112 N.J. 45, 95-104, 548 A.2d 872-90 (1988).
7 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
8 U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
9 NJ. CONST. art. I,
12.
10 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 814 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), cited in Marshall, 130 N.J. at
128, 613 A.2d at 1068. See also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593 (1977) ("At no
time in the last 50 years has a majority of the states authorized death as a punishment
for rape."); id. at 596 ("The current judgment with respect to the death penalty for
rape is not wholly unanimous among state legislatures, but it obviously weighs very
heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an
adult woman."); Tison, 481 U.S. at 152 (reviewing the several states' judgments as to
the proportionality of capital punishment as a penalty for felony-murder for persons
who do not kill or intend to kill victims); Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370 ("Of the 37 states
whose laws permit capital punishment, 15 decline to impose it upon 16-year-old offenders and 12 decline to impose it on 17-year-old offenders. This does not establish
the degree of national consensus this Court has previously thought sufficient to label
a particular punishment cruel and unusual."); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 821 (In performing the task of determining whether the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in a particular context, "the Court has reviewed the work product of
State Legislatures and sentencing juries, and has carefully considered the reasons why
a civilized society may accept or reject the death penalty in certain types of cases.");
Penry, 492 U.S. at 335 ("(Alt present, there is insufficient evidence of a national consensus against executing mentally retarded people convicted of capital offenses for us
to conclude that it is categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment."); Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 (1986) (Eighth Amendment precludes execution of
the insane based on fact that "no state in the Union" permitted such punishment).
The Constitutions of the United States and New Jersey also provide that
sentences less than death may, under certain circumstances, be disproportionate. See,
e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (holding life sentence without parole
for seventh nonviolent felony to violate Eighth Amendment). But see Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-96 (1991) (holding mandatory life sentence without parole for possessing 672 grams of cocaine not to violate the Eighth Amendment). In
determining whether these constitutions have been violated, courts look to, among
other factors, whether the punishment for the crime conforms "with contemporary
standards of decency." State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. 536, 556-57, 645 A.2d 1165, 1175
(1994) (quoting Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 169, 524 A.2d 188, 210 (1987)). This is done
by comparing the punishment at issue with others meted out in the same and other
jurisdictions. See Maldonado, 137 N.J. at 557-58, 645 A.2d at 1175; Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. at 291, 298-300. But see Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 988-993 (Scalia, J., concurring)
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provided in New Jersey Statutes Annotated, section 2C:11-3e and
addressed in this Article inquires "whether the penalty is nonetheless unacceptable in a particular case because disproportionate to
the punishment imposed on others convicted of the same crime."11
Defining the "same crime" for purposes of this analysis is, however, a critical and much-debated issue. Prosecutors have argued
that the appropriate universe of cases to be used in proportionality
review is one comprised exclusively of cases in which the death sentence was sought and imposed. In contrast, defense counsel have
contended that proportionality review demands a universe including all cases in which the death sentence could have been imposed,
whether or not it was actually sought.1" In State v. Marshall,13 the
Supreme Court of New Jersey, after intense litigation of the issue,
held that the appropriate "universe" of cases to be considered by
the court in conducting statutory proportionality review was all
clearly death-eligible homicides, whether or not capitally prosecuted.1 4 After Marshallhad been argued, but before it was decided,
the legislature amended the Capital Punishment Act to limit the
universe of cases in the manner originally sought by prosecutors.
Thus, proportionality review is now "limited to a comparison of
similar cases in which a sentence of death has been imposed."' 5
So far, the New Jersey Supreme Court has cited ex post facto
concerns in refusing to apply this amendment to the proportionality reviews that it has undertaken.1 6 Yet, the day is not far off when
these concerns will dissipate and the court will face the prospect of
conducting proportionality review using a universe of cases that includes only those in which a death verdict was, in fact, returned by
17
a jury.

(criticizing use of these criteria in arguing that the Eighth Amendment does not contain a proportionality requirement).
11 Pulley, 465 U.S. at 43, quoted in Marshall, 130 N.J. at 130, 613 A.2d at 1069.
12 See In the Matter of the Proportionality Review Project, 122 N.J. 345, 345-46, 585
A.2d 358, 358-59 (1990) (describing the Attorney General's argument that universe
should include only death sentenced cases); Marshall, 130 N.J. at 132-33, 613 A.2d at
1070 (same). The defense arguments were adopted by Special Master David C.
Baldus in his Death Penalty ProportionalityReview Project- Final Report to the New Jersey
Supreme Court 44-53 (1991).
13 130 N.J. 109, 613 A.2d 1059 (1992).
'4 Id. at 137, 613 A.2d at 1073.
'5 L. 1992, c. 5, codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3e (West 1995); see also Marshall
130 N.J. at 133-37, 613 A.2d at 1070-73.
16 See Marshall, 130 N.J. at 118-19, 613 A.2d at 1062-64. See also State v. DiFrisco,
142 N.J. 148, 162-63, 662 A.2d 442, 449-50 (1995); State v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3, 23, 651
A.2d 949, 958-59 (1994); State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 343-44, 645 A.2d 685, 689-90
(1994).
17 In State v. Harris, Docket No. 36,692, a currently pending proportionality re-
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As we discuss below, were the court to conduct such a proportionality review, it would be engaging in a useless exercise, utterly
incapable of vindicating the purposes or utilizing the methods of
proportionality review. Part I of this Article describes those purposes and methods and demonstrates the manner in which they
are undermined by the legislatively restricted universe.
That proportionality review is thus rendered meaningless by
the 1992 amendment to the Capital Punishment Act does not necessarily raise constitutional issues, however. Indeed, the United
States Supreme Court has held proportionality review not to be required by the United States Constitution in all circumstances."8
Part II of this Article argues that the New Jersey Constitution
should be interpreted to require proportionality review, and that
the 1992 amendment violates this constitutional guarantee by
weakening the mechanism through which it is implemented.
Restricting the universe does more than merely emasculate
proportionality review: it also threatens the constitutionality of the
New Jersey Capital Punishment Act as a whole. In Part III of this
Article, we argue that the elimination of meaningful proportionality review leaves the appellate review provisions of the Capital Punishment Act so limited as to be constitutionally deficient under
both the United States and New Jersey Constitutions.
Ironically, then, in its haste to weaken the procedures that
stand between capital defendants and their executions, and thus to
move NewJersey ever closer to its first lethal injection, the legislature, reflexively responding to the pleas of state prosecutors to
limit the scope of proportionality review, has created new constitutional problems. Even as the concerns which had prompted the
New Jersey Supreme Court to reverse the first thirty-one death verdicts that came before it 19 approach such resolution that prosecuview, the Attorney General has argued that because the defendant was convicted and
sentenced to death after enactment of L. 1992, c. 5, the New Jersey Supreme Court
must now apply the more limited universe set forth in the 1992 amendment. See Brief
on Behalf of the Attorney General Amicus Curiaein State v. Harris, Docket No. 36,692
at 6-13.
18 Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984). But see discussion infra at Part III (where
other appellate review safeguards are deficient, proportionality review may be required under the United States Constitution).
19 See generally State v. Ogelsby, 122 N.J. 522, 585 A.2d 916 (1991); State v. Moore,
122 N.J. 420, 585 A.2d 864 (1991); State v. Keitt, 121 N.J. 483, 582 A.2d 630 (1990);
State v. Harvey, 121 N.J. 407, 581 A.2d 483, cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931 (1991); State v.
Clausell, 121 N.J. 298, 580 A.2d 221 (1990); State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594, 577 A.2d 455
(1990); State v. Hightower, 120 N.J. 378, 577 A.2d 99 (1990); State v. McDougald, 120
N.J. 523, 577 A.2d 419 (1990); State v.Johnson, 120 N.J. 263, 576 A.2d 834 (1990);
State v. Rose, 120 N.J. 61, 576 A.2d 235 (1990); State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 575
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tors and judges in capital cases now understand their obligations
and death verdicts accordingly become less assailable on appeal,
the legislature's enactment of L. 1992, c. 5 has created yet a new
avenue of attack. That attack is no mere invocation of a technicality, for meaningful proportionality review is necessary to ensure the
very fairness, even-handedness and egalitarian application of the
most severe sanction available in this or any other society: statesponsored death.
I.
In Marshal the Supreme Court of New Jersey recognized that
the question of the appropriate universe of cases to be used in proportionality review is inextricably linked to the purposes to be
served by that review.2 0 The court wrote:
How detailed a compilation of homicide cases is required to facilitate an adequate proportionality review of a given death sentence depends upon the purposes to be served by that review.
We assume that the basic difference in the respective positions
of the parties about the breadth of the field of homicide cases to
serve as a source for proportionality review stems from disagreement about the objectives to be achieved by proportionality review. By identifying those objectives we shall also determine the
appropriate universe of cases.21
The court then proceeded to spell out the purposes of proportionality review, ultimately concluding that those purposes required the adoption of an expanded universe, including all cases
that were or could have been capitally prosecuted. 2 It follows that
proportionality review cannot accomplish those purposes if the
universe now mandated by the legislature is used.
First, by its statutory terms, proportionality review must result
A.2d 816 (1990); State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 575 A.2d 435 (1990); State v. Coyle, 119
N.J. 194, 574 A.2d 951 (1990); State v. Koedatich, 118 N.J. 513, 572 A.2d 622 (1990);
State v.Jackson, 118 N.J. 484, 572 A.2d 607 (1990); State v. DiFrisco, 118 NJ. 253, 571
A.2d 914 (1990); State v. Davis, 116 N.J. 341, 561 A.2d 1082 (1989); State v. Pitts, 116
N.J 580, 562 A.2d 1320 (1989); State v. Hunt, 115 N.J. 330, 558 A.2d 1259 (1989);
State v. Matulewicz, 115 N.J. 191, 557 A.2d 1001 (1989); State v. Williams, 113 N.J.
393, 550 A.2d 1172 (1988); State v. (Marie) Moore, 113 N.J. 239, 550 A.2d 117 (1988);
State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 549 A.2d 792 (1988); State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 548 A.2d
1022 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022 (1989); State v. Koedatich, 112 NJ. 225, 548
A.2d 939, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017 (1989); State v. Bey II, 112 N.J. 123, 548 A.2d 887
(1988); State v. Bey I, 112 N.J. 45, 548 A.2d 846 (1988); State v. Biegenwald, 110 N.J.
521, 542 A.2d 442 (1988); State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 524 A.2d 188 (1987).
20 State v. Marshall, 130 NJ. 109, 132, 613 A.2d 1059, 1070 (1992).
21 Id.
22

Id.
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in a determination of "whether the sentence is disproportionate to
the penalty imposed in similar cases." 23 The notion of such a review derives from the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Furman v. Georgia,24 in which the death penalty was invalidated
because it was being imposed "wantonly and freakishly," and so arbitrarily that it was "cruel and unusual in the same way that being
struck by lightening is cruel and unusual."2 5 When, four years
later, in Gregg v. Georgia,2 6 the Supreme Court upheld the amended
Georgia death penalty statute, it did so in part because it provided
for proportionality review. The Court wrote:
[T]o guard further against a situation comparable to that
presented in Furman, the Supreme Court of Georgia compares
each death sentence with the sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants to ensure that the sentence of death in a particular case is not disproportionate. On their face, these
procedures seem to satisfy the concerns of Furman. No longer
should there be "no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few
cases in which [the death
penalty] is imposed from the many
27
cases in which it is not."
The Court concluded that the proportionality review requirement of the Georgia capital sentencing system, in particular, "substantially eliminates the possibility that a person will be sentenced
to die by the action of an aberrant jury. If a time comes when
juries generally do not impose the death sentence in a certain kind
of case, the appellate review procedures assure that no defendant
convicted under such circumstances will suffer a sentence of
death."28
Thus, the first purpose of proportionality review is "to ensure
that the death penalty is being administered in a rational, non-arbitrary, and evenhanded manner, fairly and with reasonable consistency." 29 However, as the New Jersey Supreme Court held in
23 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3e (West 1995). See also Marshall 130 NJ. at 133, 613
A.2d at 1071 (quoting State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 326, 524 A.2d 29-30 (1987)
(quoting Pulley, 465 U.S. at 43)).
24 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
25 Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). The five Justices who voted to strike
down Georgia's death penalty statute in Furman did so based upon the notion that it
was being imposed discriminatorily, see generally id. at 240-57 (Douglas, J., concurring);
id. at 364-66 (Marshall, J., concurring); "arbitrarily," id. at 291-95 (Brennan,J., concurring); "wantonly and freakishly," id. (Stewart, J., concurring); "and simply too infrequently," id. at 311-13 (White, J., concurring).
26 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
27 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198 (plurality opinion) (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 313).
28

Id. at 206.

29

State v. Marshall, 130 N.J. 109, 131, 613 A.2d 1059, 1070 (1992).
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Marshall, this purpose may not be served by comparing only those
cases in which a death sentence is imposed. The court illustrated
the point with a simple example:
On the assumption that 100 robbery-felony-murder cases are
prosecuted as capital crimes, all defendants are convicted and
one defendant is sentenced to death, a comparison of the deathsentenced defendant's punishment with the punishment imposed only on other death-sentenced defendants would exclude
from the proportionality-review process the ninety-nine robberyfelony-murder defendants that juries did not sentence to death.
Indisputably, the determination whether that single death sentence is disproportionate can be made only by comparing it with
the life sentences imposed
on the ninety-nine defendants con30
victed of the same crime.

Or, as the National Center for State Courts concluded in designing a prototype proportionality review system:
Comparing a case under review solely to other cases in which a
death sentence has been imposed makes the size of the pool
more manageable. However, it fails to address the question
framed by Justice White in Furman-how can the few cases in
which a death sentence is imposed be "meaningfully distinguished" from the many apparently similar cases that resulted in
a life sentence? Although the case under review may be similar
to another death case, it may also be similar to thirty life cases.
Without examining the life cases, it is impossible to develop the
rational distinctions required. 1
In order, therefore, to at least approximate a judgment as to
whether cases in which the death penalty is imposed are meaningfully distinguishable from similar cases in which it was not, the universe must include all those cases in which the death penalty could
have been sought, including both cases in which juries or judges
30 130 N.J. at 133-34, 613 A.2d at 1070-71. See also Tichnell v. State, 468 A.2d 1, 32
(Md. 1983) (Davidson J., dissenting) ("[Mf all death eligible cases are not included in
the inventory, it is impossible conscientiously to determine whether the death penalty
has been imposed generally in similar cases throughout the State."); Linda Burgess,
Comparative Proportionality Review of Death Sentences: Is It a Meaningful Safeguard in
Oklahoma?, 38 OKLA. L. REv. 267, 278 (1985) ("If a universe is made up only of cases
in which the defendants' sentences are death, the death penalty under review will
naturally be found comparatively proportionate. Comparative proportionality review
can, therefore, be a meaningless check against excessive capital sentencing when a
court simply compares one death sentence to another death sentence.").
31 National Center for State Courts, User Manualfor Prototype ProportionalityReview
Systems, at A-7 (1984), reprinted in Richard Van Duizend, ComparativeProportionalityReview in Death Sentence Cases: What? How? Why?8 STATE CT.J. 9, 11 (1988) (footnote
omitted). See also Steven M. Sprenger, A CriticalEvaluation of State Supreme Court Proportionality Review in Death Sentence Cases, 73 IOWA L. Rxv. 719, 733 (1988).

1996]

THE IMPORTANCE OF SAVING THE UNIVERSE

1431

returned life verdicts and cases in which prosecutors chose not to
proceed capitally. Similarly, to assure that the death penalty is being imposed in only the most heinous cases, the court must conduct as complete a comparison as possible with those cases in
which the death penalty was not imposed, either because a judge
or jury chose not to impose it or because it was not sought by a
prosecutor.3 2
The second purpose of proportionality review identified by
the New Jersey Supreme Court in Marshall was "to address concerns about possible misuse of prosecutorial discretion."3 3 Indeed,
the use, and possible abuse, of such discretion has long been a subject of concern and controversy in New Jersey. Even after
prosecutorial guidelines were promulgated, at the insistence of the
New Jersey Supreme Court, 4 the sufficiency of those guidelines in
practice is a matter that has been explicitly left for proportionality
review.3 5
Of course, this makes perfect sense, as there can be no doubt
but that, as the MarshallCourt acknowledged, "disproportionality
can originate in both prosecutorial and jury decisions."3 6 The Marshall Court explained:
The point may best be illustrated by the prior example of 100
robbery-felony-murder defendants, only one of whom is sen32 Indeed, the evidence suggests that by excluding cases that end in plea bargains,
the court would be ignoring many of the most aggravated murders. DAVID C. BALDuS,
ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY. A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYsis 284
& n.23 (1990).
33 Marshall, 130 N.J. at 134, 613 A.2d at 1071 (quoting Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 329, 524
A.2d at 293).
34 See State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 258, 548 A.2d 949, 955 (1988).
35 See State v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128, 186, 590 A.2d 624, 653-54 (1991) (Stein,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (whether guidelines are "sufficiently specific to
overcome the problem of arbitrariness in the designation of cases for capital prosecution [is] a problem that is addressed currently only in the course of proportionality
review of a death sentence that has been affirmed"); Marshall, 123 N.J. at 251, 586
A.2d at 204 (Handler, J., dissenting) (expressing hope that problem of prosecutorial
discretion would be the subject of a "thorough, mandatory proportionality review")
(citing State v. Kiett, 121 N.J. 483, 511, 582 A.2d 630, 644-45 (1990) (Handler, J.,
dissenting)); State v. Di Frisco, 118 N.J. 253, 302-05, 571 A.2d 914, 939-41 (1990)
(Handler, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); State v. Matulewicz, 115 N.J.
191, 206-09, 557 A.2d 1001, 1009-11 (1989) (Handler, J., concurring); State v. Gerald,
113 N.J. 40, 153-67, 549 A.2d 792, 850-58 (1988) (Handler, J., concurring in part and
dissenting)). See also State v. Moore, 122 N.J. 420, 486-87, 585 A.2d 864, 898-99
(1991); State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 503, 575 A.2d 435, 467 (1990).
36 Marshall, 130 NJ. at 134, 613 A.2d at 1071 (citing Kiet4 121 N.J. at 492, 582 A.2d
at 634-35). See alsoJoseph H. Rodriguez, et al., ProportionalityReview in New Jersey: An
Indispensable Safeguard in the Capital Sentencing Process, 15 RuTGERs L.J. 399, 424-30
(1984).
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tenced to death. Were we to assume that the remaining ninetynine defendants were prosecuted and convicted of non-capital
murder because of prosecutorial decisions not to seek the death
penalty, the disproportionality of the single defendant's death
sentence would arise not because of a disproportionate jury determination but because the prosecutorial decision to seek the
death penalty was unique. That type of disproportionate death
sentence could not be identified by a proportionality-review process that was limited to capital cases tried to a penalty phase; it
could be identified, however, by a universe that included clearly
death-eligible homicides that were not prosecuted as capital
37
cases.

Finally, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Marshall identified
as a third purpose of proportionality review "the prevention of 'any
'3 8
impermissible discrimination in imposing the death penalty.'
From the first, proportionality review was viewed as "a means
through which to monitor the imposition of death sentences and
thereby to prevent any impermissible discrimination in imposing
the death penalty." 39 It must "insure that elements of sexual, racial, and social-economic discrimination do not invidiously infect
the prosecutorial charging decision,"' or influence jury verdicts.4 1
Indeed, the Attorney General of New Jersey originally urged the
enactment of a proportionality review provision "to make sure that
[death] sentences are being meted out in a fair, even-handed way
throughout the State, and that we do not have either classes of
individuals or areas in the State which appear to be arbitrary one
way or the other."4 2
37 130 NJ. at 134-35, 614 A.2d at 135 (emphasis in original). See also Rodriguez, et
al.,
supranote 36, at 429; Sprenger, supranote 36, at 735-36; Van Duizend, supra note
33, at 11-12 (although the universe should include, "as a minimum, all cases in which
the indictment included a death-eligible charge, and a homicide conviction was obtained... [w] hen there is concern about the exercise of prosecutorial discretion... a
pool of cases including all murder indictments may be desirable"); Tichnell 468 A.2d
at 24-25 (Eldridge, J., concurring) (in order for proportionality review to cure the
aberration resulting from the variable exercise of prosecutorial discretion, cases other
than those in which the death penalty was sought must be considered); id. at 33-34
(Davidson, J., dissenting) (same).
38 Marshal 130 N.J. at 135, 613 A.2d at 1072 (quoting Ramseur, 106 NJ. at 327, 524
A.2d at 292-93).
39 Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 327, 524 A.2d at 292. See also id. at 330, 524 A.2d at 293-94.
40 Rodriguez, et al., supra note 36, at 429-30.
41 Id. at 430-32. See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240-57 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
42 Hearings on S.112 Before the N.J. Senate Judiciay Comm., 200th Leg., 2nd Sess. 2021. See also Rodriguez, et al., supra note 36, at 429 n.203 (proportionality review
should be applied "to guard against an imbalance, a disproportionate imposition of
the death penalty in any one area") (Stier statement).
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The New Jersey Supreme Court has always reserved issues of
bias in the capital sentencing scheme for proportionality review.
Thus, it has stated that one purpose of proportionality review is to
"prevent discrimination on an impermissible basis, including, but
not limited to, race and sex."4 3 Statistical information regarding
such issues as whether there are county-by-county or race-related
disparities with respect to the pursuit of the death penalty is to be
considered by the court in performing proportionality review.4
And the court has even promised that proportionality review would
address "the question of whether in NewJersey the death sentence
is being disproportionately imposed upon mentally-disturbed
defendants.

45

Each proportionality review thus far undertaken by the court
has, in fact, included the consideration of issues of discrimination.
In MarshaI4' the court held that neither the race of the victim nor
the race of the defendant had been shown to have played an impermissible invidious role in the imposition of the death penalty in
New Jersey. In so concluding, however, the court explicitly rejected the United States Supreme Court's holding in McCleskey v.
Kemp,47 to the effect that a showing of purposeful discrimination,
which could not be established by statistical analysis, was required.48 It also reiterated that "the people of New Jersey would
not tolerate a system that condones disparate treatment for black
and white defendants or a system that would debase the value of a
black victim's life,"49 and stated:
were we to believe that the race of the victim and race of the
defendant played a significant part in capital sentencing decisions in New Jersey, we would seek corrective measures, and if
that failed we could not, consistent with our State's policy, tolerate discrimination
that threatened the foundation of our system
50
of law.

Again in State v. Bey," the NewJersey Supreme Court utilized proportionality review to consider ever more extensive and troubling
data revealing race-based disparities in the frequency with which
43 Ramseur,

106 N.J. at 330, 524 A.2d at 293-94.

State v. Koedatich, 112 NJ. 225, 255-58, 548 A.2d 939, 954-55 (1988).
State v. Zola, 112 NJ. 384, 437, 548 A.2d 1022, 1049 (1988).
130 NJ. at 207-15, 613 A.2d at 1109-12.
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
Marshal 130 NJ. at 209, 613 A.2d at 1109-10. See also id. at 210-15, 613 A.2d at
1110-13 (quotingJustice Brennan's dissenting opinion in McCleskey).
49 Id. at 214, 613 A.2d at 1112.
50 Id. at 209, 613 A.2d at 1109-10.
51 137 N.J. 334, 645 A.2d 685 (1994).
44
45
46
47
48

1434

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:1423

juries impose death verdicts.5 2 Although the court recognized that
the data had been analyzed in a more sophisticated manner than
ever before, and that more and more cases had been added to the
universe, it held that there were still too few cases to hold "that
race impermissibly influences the imposition of the death penalty."13 The court adhered to this holding in its proportionality
reviews in State v. Martini4 and State v. DiFrisco.55 As this Article
goes to press, however, new data have emerged, in connection with
5 6 that race plays a statisthe proportionality review in State v. Harris,
tically significant role in capital sentencing. Indeed, according to
data developed by the court itself, the odds of a black defendant
receiving a death sentence are almost ten times greater than are
the odds of a nonblack defendant whose case has the same aggravating and mitigating characteristics.5 7
These disturbing facts are currently the subject of written debate between and among the parties and amici curiaein Harris,and
as to which there will be oral argument before and probably a decision by the state supreme court next term. Notably, however, the
issue could not even be reasonably debated without the expanded
universe of cases that the court has thus far utilized. As the court
stated in Marshall "[t]he conclusion is inescapable that a universe
restricted to penalty-phase cases would be inadequate to enable us
to verify that our capital-sentencing procedure does not tolerate
'discrimination on an impermissible basis, including, but not limited to, race and sex.'"58 Specifically, to the extent that such discrimination originates in prosecutorial decisionmaking, it could
not be monitored in the absence of a universe including cases in
Id. at 388-96, 645 A.2d at 711-16.
Id. at 393-94, 645 A.2d at 714-15. See also id. at 388, 645 A.2d at 711-12.
139 NJ. 3, 80, 651 A.2d 949, 987 (1994).
55 142 NJ. 148, 210, 662 A.2d 442, 473 (1995).
56 State v. Harris, Docket No. 36,962, scheduled for oral argument on September
10, 1996.
57 See Administrative Office of the Courts, Criminal Practice Division, State v. Joseph Harris, Appendices and Tables, Technical Appendix 10, Schedule 5 (showing
.odds ratio" of 9.989 for the variable "black defendant," which is statistically significant at a level of p = .0083, in regression analysis accounting for numerous statutory
and non-statutory variables). As the expert retained by the Administrative Office of
the Courts has concluded, "... these analyses suggest strong and consistent biases in
the application of death sentencing in New Jersey." Memorandum from David Weisburd to John P. McCarthy, Jr., Dec. 20, 1995, at 6. This conclusion is, as this matter
goes to press, the subject of vigorous litigation between and among the parties and
amid in the Harris case.
58 MarshalI4 130 NJ. at 136, 613 A.2d at 1072 (quoting Ramseur, 106 NJ. at 330, 524
A.2d at 294-95).
52

53
54
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which the death penalty was not sought.5 9 Thus, even a universe
consisting of all cases that advance to a penalty trial would be insufficient for this purpose "because it excludes from judicial oversight
such a large part of the state's capital sentencing system, especially
the decisions of prosecutors. "60
However, a universe restricted to death sentenced cases would
even further prevent the court from effectively probing discrimination in the operation of the capital sentencing system. Thus, in
order to probe the discriminatory effects ofjury decisionmaking, a
universe consisting of at least all penalty trial cases is required. Indeed, in the absence of such a universe, the issue will be left completely unaddressed. As Chief Justice Krivosha of the Nebraska
Supreme Court put it:
The purpose of [proportionality review] was to ensure that persons were not being arbitrarily sentenced to death. To therefore suggest that we look only at those individuals who may have
been discriminated against to determine whether or not they
have been discriminated against is an exercise in futility. If one
wants to determine whether individuals are being discriminated
against in public transportation, one does not merely look at
those who are required to sit in the back of the bus and conclude that since everyone in the back of the bus looks alike,
there is no discrimination. One, of necessity, must look at who
is riding in the front of the bus as well in order to determine
whether the persons in the back are being discriminated
against. So, too, there is no way that we can determine whether
those who are sentenced to death are being discriminated
against if we do not examine those cases having the same or
similar circumstances which, for whatever reason, did not result
in the imposition of the death sentence.6 1
In sum, as the New Jersey Supreme Court held in Marshall,
"the purposes to be achieved by proportionality review require that
the universe include clearly death eligible homicides in which the
Rodriguez, supra note 36, at 429-30.
BALDUS, ET AL., supra note 32, at 284. See also Tichnell v. State, 468 A.2d 1, 26-27
(Md. 1983) (Cole, J., concurring) ("Only with a full range of information about the
individual defendants potentially but not ultimately exposed to the death penalty can
this Court make a sound proportionality decision and thereby be assured that it has
given no quarter to disproportionality based solely on factors such as race, sex, or
wealth."). See also generally F. Patrick Hubbard et al., A Meaningful Basis for the Death
Penalty: The Practice, ConstitutionalityandJustice of CapitalPunishment in South Carolina,
34 S.C. L. Rxv. 391, 442-43 (1982).
61 State v. Palmer, 399 N.W.2d 706, 752 (Neb. 1986) (Krivosha, CJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoted in Marshall, 130 NJ. at 250-51, 613 A.2d at 113031 (Handler, J., dissenting)).
59
60
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prosecutor elected not to seek the death penalty."6 2 Although the
court did not analyze it this way, such a universe is also required by
the methodology through which proportionality review is conducted. That methodology is discussed below.
In New Jersey, the supreme court has conducted proportionality review using two methods. First, the court has employed the
"Frequency Approach." Using this approach, the court computes
the frequency of death sentences within a pool of similar cases.63
The statistical analysis that emerges reveals how jurors and prosecutors treat similar cases and thus seeks to measure "the societal consensus that death is the appropriate penalty in the measured
cases."' Frequency analysis has the advantage of being relatively
62 Marshal4 130 NJ. at 137, 613 A.2d at 1072-73. In support of this holding, the
Marshallcourt pointed to the jurisdictions that adopted a similarly expansive universe.
See id. at 136-37, 613 A.2d at 1072-73 (citing TichneU, 468 A.2d at 18 (concluding proportionality-review process may take into account noncapital murder cases)); State v.
Moore, 316 N.W.2d 33, 44 (Neb.) (conducting proportionality review by comparison
with all other first-degree-murder convictions), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984 (1982); State
v. Williams, 287 N.W.2d 18, 28-29 (Neb. 1979) (same), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891
(1980); Commonwealth v. Pursell, 495 A.2d 183, 198 (Pa. 1985) (conducting proportionality review by comparison with other first-degree-murder cases in which evidence
could support an aggravating circumstance); State v. Rupe, 743 P.2d 210, 229 (Wash.
1987) (concluding that for purposes of proportionality review, similar cases include
cases in which defendant convicted of first-degree murder regardless of whether
death penalty was sought), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061 (1988); State v. Harris, 725 P.2d
975, 982-83 (Wash. 1986) (conducting proportionality review of death sentence for
contract killing court considered contract-murder cases in which death penalty was
not sought by prosecutor), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940 (1987).
63 Similar cases are identified for purposes of frequency analysis in three ways.
First, a complex "salient-factors measure" is used to assemble similar cases by assessing
factual blameworthiness using a battery of both statutory and nonstatutory aggravating and mitigating factors; these factors are identified based upon both assumptions
and empirical data that establish the relationship between these factors and the
blameworthiness of a defendant. See Marshal 130 NJ. at 146, 613 A.2d at 1077; see
also DiFrisco, 142 NJ. at 172, 662 A.2d 454; Martini, 139 NJ. at 33, 651 A.2d at 963; Bey,
137 NJ. at 353, 645 A.2d at 694-95.
Second, similar cases are collected by simply counting numbers of aggravating
and mitigating factors. See Marshal 130 N.J. at 146-47, 613 A.2d at 1077-78; see also
DiFrisco, 142 NJ. at 175, 662 A.2d at 455-56; Martini, 139 N.J. at 38, 651 A.2d at 966;
Bey, 137 N.J. at 358, 645 A.2d at 697. Finally, a set of similar cases are derived by using
an "index-of-outcomes test," which uses statistical analysis to produce a scale of overall
defendant culpability as measured by the presence or absence of factors that appear
to influence prosecutorial or jury decisionmaking; those cases ranked near each other
on this scale would be deemed similar for purposes of conducting frequency analysis.
See Marshall 130 N.J. at 14748, 613 A.2d at 1078-79; see also DiFrisco, 142 N.J. at 178-79,
662 A.2d at 457-58; Martini, 139 N.J. at 41-43, 651 A.2d at 968-69; Bey, 137 N.J. at 362,
645 A.2d at 698-99. For each such set of similar cases, a death-sentencing rate is
calculated.
64 See Bey, 137 N.J. at 350, 645 A.2d at 693. See also DiFrisco, 142 N.J. at 166, 662
A.2d at 451; Martini, 139 N.J. at 28, 651 A.2d at 960.
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objective;6 5 it also helps the court "to review cases in terms of the
substantive principle that... should be controlling in these cases,
namely, '[a] death sentence is comparatively excessive if other defendants with similar characteristics generally receive sentences
other than death for committing factually similar offenses in the
same jurisdiction."' 6 6
Obviously, a universe of only death-sentenced cases could not
be utilized to perform a frequency analysis. To the extent that societal consensus is measured by jury verdicts, a universe that does not
include life verdicts could not be used to calculate the "rate of
death sentencing in similar cases," 67 because the resulting rate will
always be 100 percent. Similarly, to the extent that prosecutors reflect, or predict, emerging societal consensus, their actions too
68
must be taken into account in performing frequency analysis.
This, of course, cannot occur if only death-sentenced cases are considered, for these, by definition, include only cases in which the
death penalty was sought. Thus, a universe including only those
cases in which the death penalty was sought does not include those
in which it was not, as is necessary to establish a rate that reveals
how "prosecutors treat similar cases."6 9
Nor could the limited universe of death-sentenced only cases
be used to undertake the precedent-seeking approach that constitutes the second method of performing proportionality review.
Precedent seeking analysis is "more intuitive" than is the frequency
approach,7 and "engages familiar judicial case-by-case analysis,
wherein we compare defendant's case to factually similar cases in
order to discern whether defendant is deathworthy vis-A-vis other
1
7

similarly situated defendants."

65 See Marshall,130 NJ. at 152, 613 A.2d at 1080-81 (citing State v.Jeffries, 717 P.2d
722, 744-45 (Wash.) (Utler,J., dissenting), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 922 (1986)). See also
Van Duizend, supra note 30, at 10-11; David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of
Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CraM. L. & CRIMINOLoGy 661, 670 (1983) (hereinafter Baldus, "Comparative Review").
66 Marshall, 130 N.J. at 153-54, 613 A.2d at 1081-82 (quoting Tichnell v. State, 468
A.2d 1, 17 n.18 (Md. 1983)). See also David C. Baldus, et al., Arbitrarinessand Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty, 15 STETSON L. REv. 133 (1986).
67 See, e.g., DiFrisco,142 NJ. at 166, 662 A.2d at 445-46; Martini, 139 N.J. at 28, 651
A.2d at 961.
68 See Tichnell, 468 A.2d at 30 (Davidson,J., dissenting) ("the judgment of prosecutors constitutes an objective index of contemporary standards of decency, [and] the
fact that in certain circumstances prosecutors rarely seek the death penalty is relevant
and should be considered in determining whether the death penalty is excessive or
disproportionate").
69 DiFrisco, 142 NJ. at 166, 662 A.2d at 451; Martini, 139 N.J. at 28, 651 A.2d at 961.
70 Bey, 137 NJ. at 350, 645 A.2d at 693.
71 DiFrisco, 142 NJ. at 166, 662 A.2d at 451. See also Martini, 139 N.J. at 28, 651
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This type of precedent-seeking review could not, by its very
nature, function without consideration of all factually similar cases.
Thus, as the Supreme Court of New Jersey has demonstrated in
each of the proportionality reviews that it has undertaken, the precedent-seeking approach proceeds by identifying such cases, and
then inquiring whether the case before it reflects an unfair singling
out of the defendant for capital punishment,7 2 that is, whether the
case is "aberrant."7 3 In order to do so, the court must "examine
defendant's criminal culpability to determine whether it exceeds
that of similar life-sentenced defendants and whether it equals or
exceeds that of other death-sentenced defendants."7 4 In Marshall,
the court described this process as "the familiar judicial process of
case-by-case comparison of life-sentenced and death-sentenced similar
75
cases."
As defined, this analysis would be woefully incomplete without
a comparison of the case before the court with life-sentenced, as
well as death-sentenced, cases. One cannot tell whether a case is
more like life-sentenced than death-sentenced cases if only the latter may be considered, just as one cannot tell whether a child looks
more like her mother than her father unless one can see both parents. Precedent-seeking review, then, like frequency analysis, cannot proceed using the universe of cases that the New Jersey
Legislature has now imposed upon the court. Both methods used
in proportionality review are, then, rendered useless by L. 1992, c.
5, just as all of the purposes of that review are rendered unattainable thereby. Though it purports to affect only the universe of cases
used, the 1992 amendment thus robs proportionality review of all
meaning, increasing the risk that the death penalty will be imposed
in a case in which it should not.
II.
As is discussed above, L. 1992, c. 5, renders proportionality
review meaningless. With this amendment, the purposes of proA.2d at 961; Bey, 137 NJ. at 350, 645 A.2d at 693; Marshall 130 NJ. at 154, 613 A.2d at
1081-82; Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104, 140-43 (Del. 1983).
72 See DiFrisco, 142 NJ. at 184, 662 A.2d at 460; Martin; 139 NJ. at 47, 651 A.2d at
971; MarshaI 130 NJ. at 159, 613 A.2d at 1085.
73 Bey, 137 N.J. at 369, 645 A.2d at 702.
74 DiFrisco, 142 N.J. at 184, 662 A.2d at 460; Martini, 139 NJ. at 47, 651 A.2d at 971.
If the defendant's culpability is more like that of similar life-sentenced defendants
and less like that of death-sentenced defendants, then his sentence may, using this
methodology, be deemed disproportionate. Id.
75 Marshall 130 N.J. at 154, 613 A.2d at 1082 (emphasis added).
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portionality review are not served and the methods established for
that review become useless. This evisceration of the proportionality review provisions of the Capital Punishment Act might not, however, violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution because proportionality review is not required by the
federal constitution under all circumstances. 7 6 Such a drastic curtailment, however, does violate the New Jersey Constitution, as we
discuss below.
First, the constitutionality of the Capital Punishment Act depends upon the existence of meaningful proportionality review
prior to the imposition of a death sentence. In State v. Ramseur,"
the NewJersey Supreme Court upheld the NewJersey Capital Punishment Act 7 8 as against a broad challenge to its constitutionality.
In finding that the Act survived scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the court explicitly
relied upon the mandatory appellate review provisions of the Act,7 9
review which, the court stated, it would exercise "in accordance
with applicable constitutional standards."80 Additionally, however,
the court noted that the Act "provide [d] several procedural protections for the defendant that are not required under the constitutional analysis of the [United States] Supreme Court," including
"the authorization to conduct proportionality review upon the defendant's request."8 1
The court also upheld the Capital Punishment Act as against a
constitutional challenge based upon the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of Article I, paragraph 12 of the NewJersey Constitution of 1947. Although the court found that the New Jersey
analog "provides an additional and, where appropriate, more expansive source of protections against the arbitrary and
nonindividualized imposition of the death penalty,"8 2 it held that
the Act survived state constitutional scrutiny as well. In doing so,
however, the court expressed "concerns with respect to the need
for controlling prosecutorial discretion and the importance of proportionality review even in the absence of a request by the defend76 Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984). But see discussion infra at Point III (where
other appellate review safeguards are insufficient, proportionality review may be required under the United States Constitution).
77 106 N.J. 123, 524 A.2d 188 (1987).
78 L. 1992, c. 111, codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 1995).
79 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 1995).
80 106 N.J. at 186 & n.18, 524 A.2d at 218-19 & 219 n.18.
81 Id. at 186, 524 A.2d at 219.
82 Id. at 190, 524 A.2d at 221.
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ant.""3 At the time, however, it found such concerns, however, to
be "premature," promising to "consider these issues if and when
they arise. " "
Without squarely confronting the question of whether the
New Jersey Constitution requires proportionality review, the court
in Ramseur made absolutely clear that it viewed proportionality review as playing a role of constitutional importance in the implementation of the death penalty in this State. Describing it as an
"important aspect of the death penalty review process," the Ramseur
Court embarked upon a discussion of proportionality review in order "to guide future parties in their exploration of some of the
issues that appear essential to the development of a proportionality
review process that would satisfy the requirements of the statute
and any applicable constitutional obligations.""5
Recognizing that in Pulley v. Harris,6 the Supreme Court of
the United States had held proportionality review not to be mandated by the Eighth Amendment in all cases, the court went on to
quote the dissenting opinion in Pulley to the effect that
"[p]roportionality review assists us in assuring that 'we have
designed procedures which are appropriate to the decision between life and death and [that] we have followed those procedures. '"' Thus, the court held that proportionality review "acts 'as
a check against the random and arbitrary imposition of the death
penalty' by an aberrant jury,"88 and therefore sought to "devise a
procedure of review that will adequately protect defendants from
the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty prohibited by Furman v. Georgia."8"
Similarly echoing the Pulley dissent, the Ramseur court expressed its concern that "given the emotions generated by capital
crimes, it may well be that juries, trial judges and appellate courts
considering sentences of death [may be] affected by impermissible
considerations." 0 The court therefore assigned to proportionality
review the constitutionally significant role of providing "a means
through which to monitor the imposition of death sentences and
Id. at 193, 524 A.2d at 222.
Id.
85 Id. at 325, 524 A.2d at 291 (emphasis added).
86 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
87 Ramseur, 106 NJ. at 326-27, 524 A.2d at 292 (quoting Pu//ey, 465 U.S. at 68-69
(Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (citations omitted)).
88 Id. at 327, 524 A.2d at 292 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976)).
89 Id. at 328, 524 A.2d at 292 (citing 408 U.S. 238).
90 Id. at 327, 524 A.2d at 292 (quoting Pulley, 465 U.S. at 64 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting)).
83
84
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thereby to prevent any impermissible discrimination in imposing
the death penalty."9 1
In sum, in the course of rejecting state and federal constitutional challenges to the Capital Punishment Act, the New Jersey
Supreme Court described proportionality review as "an important
procedural mechanism to safeguard against the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty."9 2 The court thus required proportionality review to play the constitutionally essential
functions of "assur[ing] similar results in similar cases and ... prevent[ing] discrimination on an impermissible basis, including, but
"
not limited to, race and sex. 93
After Ramseur, the NewJersey Supreme Court continued to assign this essential role to proportionality review. Thus, the court
repeatedly restated its understanding that proportionality review
would address "the problem of arbitrariness in the designation of
cases for capital prosecution."9 4 In particular, the court continued
to require that proportionality review include an examination of
county-by-county and racial disparities in the administration of the
death penalty,9" and even "the question of whether in New Jersey
the death penalty is being disproportionately imposed upon mentally disturbed defendants."9" And, perhaps most significantly, the
court repeated that these functions were of constitutional
dimension."
When, finally, the court set about to perform proportionality
review, it did so with these constitutional functions in mind. Repeatedly, in the course of its first four proportionality reviews, the
court has emphasized that the purpose of such review is "to ensure
that the death penalty is being administered in a rational, non-arbitrary, and evenhanded manner, fairly and with reasonable consis91 Id.

92 Id. at 330, 524 A.2d at 294.
93 Id.
94 State v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128, 186, 590 A.2d 624, 654 (1991) (Stein, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). See also In the Matter of the Proportionality Review
Project, 122 N.J. 345, 346, 585 A.2d 358, 359 (1990) (quoting Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 330,
524 A.2d at 294) (reiterating that "the proportionality review provision in the Act is an
important procedural mechanism to safeguard against the arbitrary and capricious
imposition of the death penalty").
95 See State v. Koedatich, 112 NJ. 225, 255-58, 548 A.2d 939, 954-56 (1988).
96 State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 437, 548 A.2d 1022, 1048-49 (1988).
97 See State v. Hightower, 120 NJ. 378, 415, 577 A.2d 99, 116-17 (1990) (holding
that "[w] ithout a record concerning mitigating evidence we would be unable to fulfill
our constitutional and statutory duty to review the proportionality of a defendant's
sentence") (emphasis added).
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tency," and that this purpose is of constitutional dimension.9 8
Consistently, the court has included as a function of proportionality review "the prevention of 'any impermissible discrimination in
imposing the death penalty.'" 9 9 And throughout, it has referred to
Ramseur, in which the court made clear that these goals of consistency and nondiscrimination are of constitutional dimension." °°
It follows that proportionality review is, in NewJersey, constitutionally mandated. This is true notwithstanding the holding of the
United States Supreme Court that proportionality review is not required under the federal Constitution in every case in which the
death penalty is imposed and the defendant requests it.10 1
98 State v. Marshall, 130 NJ. 109, 131, 613 A.2d 1059, 1069-70 (1992); see also State
v. Bey, 137 NJ. 334, 343, 645 A.2d 685, 689 (1994) (discussing proportionality review
and stating that "[i]n general, the death penalty must be imposed fairly and with
reasonable consistency"); State v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3, 21, 651 A.2d 949, 958 (1994)
(proportionality review "permits New Jersey's capital-sentencing scheme to comply
with the dictates of Furmanand with the Eighth Amendment, which prohibit arbitrary
and inconsistent application of the death penalty"); State v. DiFrisco, 142 N.J. 148,
162, 662 A.2d 442, 449 (1995) (though not required by the federal Constitution, proportionality review "allows [the NewJersey Supreme] Court to monitor the results of
jury discretion and prevent the arbitrary and inconsistent application of the death
penalty").
99 Marshall, 130 NJ. at 135, 613 A.2d at 1072 (quoting Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 327, 524
A.2d at 292); see also Bey, 137 N.J. at 388-96, 645 A.2d at 711-16 (utilizing proportionality review to examine whether impermissible race-based disparities exist in the capital
sentencing process).
100 See, e.g., Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 181-83, 524 A.2d at 216-18 (quoted in Marshall, 130
NJ. at 131, 613 A.2d at 1069-70). See also Koedatich, 112 NJ. at 251, 548 A.2d at 952
("the NewJersey Constitution... mandates consistency and reliability in the administration of capital punishment") (citing Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 190, 524 A.2d at 221).
101 Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50-51 (1983). Proportionality review may be required under the United States Constitution where other safeguards of appellate review are inadequate. Indeed, the NewJersey Capital Punishment Act is so lacking in
appellate review safeguards that meaningful proportionality review is required by the
United States Constitution. See generally infra at Part III. For this reason, with a universe limited to death-sentenced cases, New Jersey's death penalty law therefore also
violates the United States Constitution. See id.
In State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 549 A.2d 792 (1988), the New Jersey Supreme
Court refused to follow a similar curtailment of capital defendants' rights adopted by
the United States Supreme Court. See generally id. In Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782
(1982), the United States Supreme Court had held that only those defendants who
intend to kill are eligible for the death penalty. See id. at 797. In Tison v. Arizona, 481
U.S. 137 (1987), however, the Supreme Court severely curtailed Enmund, holding that
defendants could be eligible for the death penalty even if they did not intend to kill
the decedent. See id. at 156-58. Rather than following the Supreme Court's retrenchment in Tison, however, our state supreme court in Gerald adhered to its prior decision in Ramseur, which had been based on Enmund, and refused to lessen the
protections of the state constitution, notwithstanding the more restrictive ruling of
the United States Supreme Court. See generally Gerald, 113 N.J. at 75-90, 549 A.2d at
810-18; State v. Moore, 113 NJ. 239, 300-01, 550 A.2d 117, 148 (1988).
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There is, of course, nothing unique about the NewJersey Constitution requiring greater protections for defendants than does
the United States Constitution:
In our federal system, state constitutions have a significant role
to play as protectors of individual rights and liberties. This role
derives its character from the freedom of state courts to move
beyond the protections provided by federal doctrine and from
the distinctive character of state courts and state constitutions.... The present function of state constitutions is as a second line of defense for those rights protected by the federal
Constitution and as an independent
source of supplemental
°2
rights unrecognized by federal law.'
As Justice Brennan recognized nearly twenty years ago,
state courts no less than federal are and ought to be the guardians of our liberties ....

[S]tate courts cannot rest when they

have afforded their citizens the full protections of the federal
Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of individual
liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law.'
Thus, each state has the "sovereign right to adopt in its own
Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution."'0 4 Historically, state constitutions have provided protections for individual liberties
independent of the federal Constitution.'0 "
Indeed, our
"[u]nderstanding of the relationship between the United States
Supreme Court and a state Supreme Court as interpreters of constitutional rights begins with the recollection that the original
states, including New Jersey, and their Constitutions preceded the
formation of the federal government and its Constitution."106 As
New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Morris Pashman eloquently
stated over a decade ago: "The citizens of New Jersey have adopted
a constitution that ensures their liberties independent of the federal law. The NewJersey Constitution is not an empty gesture. It is
102 State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 346, 450 A.2d 952, 955 (1982) (quoting The Interpretation of State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HAav. L. REv. 1324, 1367 (1982)).
103 WilliamJ. Brennan,Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protectionof Individual Rights, 90
HAav. L. REv. 489, 491 (1977).
104 Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980). See also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 718 (1975);
State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 225, 440 A.2d 1311, 1318 (1981); Brennan, supra note 103.
105 Brennan, supra note 103, at 501 ("Prior to the adoption of the Federal Constitution, each of the rights eventually recognized in the federal Bill of Rights had previously been protected in one or more state constitutions.").
106 Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 299, 450 A.2d 925, 931 (1982) (citation

omitted).
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the bedrock of liberty in this State."1 0 7
It is, then undisputed that "although the federal Constitution
may remain as the basic charter, state constitutions may serve as a
supplemental source of fundamental liberties."'10 In other words,
the federal Constitution serves as a floor in protecting individual
rights and no state may afford protection below this level; state
courts may, however, interpret their state constitutions to require
greater protections. 10 9 "[T]he United States Constitution as construed by the United States Supreme Court establishes the minimum degree of protection a state must give to constitutional
rights.... [S]tate constitutions may provide further protection for
individual liberties by limiting state powers to a greater degree
than they are limited by the federal constitution."110
Thus, the proposition that our state supreme court "has the
power to construe the NewJersey Constitution to reach results contrary to United States Supreme Court decisions construing the federal constitution is not controverted.""' Where federal law is
insufficient to protect the state constitutional rights of citizens,
state courts are free-and indeed are obligated-to undertake an
independent analysis of the state provision and to provide greater
rights. 1 2 Specifically, where decisions of the United States
Supreme Court fail to pay "due regard to precedent and the policies underlying specific constitutional guarantees,"" 3 state courts
need not follow them.
Applying this principle, the New Jersey Supreme Court has interpreted provisions of the state constitution more broadly than
their federal counterparts on numerous occasions. 4 Specifically,
107

part).

Id. at 333, 450 A.2d at 949 (Pashman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

Id. at 300, 450 A.2d at 931 (citing Brennan, supra note 103).
Id. ("the individual states may accord greater respect than the federal government to certain fundamental rights"); see also generally id. at 330-32, 450 A.2d at 947-49
(Pashman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
110 State v. Hunt, 91 NJ. 338, 353-54, 450 A.2d 952, 959-60 (1982) (Pashman, J.,
concurring).
I11 Id. at 353, 450 A.2d at 959 (Pashman, J., concurring).
112 See generally Brennan, supra note 103, at 498-502 (reviewing cases that recognize
independence of state constitutions from federal counterparts).
113 Id. at 502.
114 See, e.g., State v. Hogan, 144 NJ. 216, 231, 676 A.2d 533, 540 (1996); Doe v.
Poritz, 142, N.J. 1, 104, 662 A.2d 367, 419 (1995); NewJersey Coalition Against the
War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty, 138 N.J. 326, 650 A.2d 757 (1994); State v.
Pierce, 136 N.J. 184, 208-13, 642 A.2d 947, 959-62 (1994); State v. Hempele, 120 NJ.
182, 196-97, 576 A.2d 793, 800-01 (1990); State v. Mollica, 114 NJ. 329, 352-53, 554
A.2d 1315, 1327 (1989); State v. Novembrino, 105 NJ. 96, 145, 519 A.2d 820, 849
(1987); State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 522-23, 511 A.2d 1150, 1157 (1986); Hunt, 91
108
109
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the court has done so when one or more of the following criteria
are present: 115 (1) textual language differences between the state
constitutional provision and the federal counterpart;' 1 6 (2) legislative history that reveals an intention to provide protections independent of federal law;" 7 (3) preexisting state law that suggests
distinctive state constitutional rights;" 8 (4) structural differences
between the federal and state constitutions that provide a basis for
rejecting the constraints of federal doctrine at the state level;' 19 (5)
NJ. at 344, 450 A.2d at 955; Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 257, 299-310, 450 A.2d
925, 931-37 (1982); State v. Alston, 88 NJ. 211, 440 A.2d 1311 (1981); In re Grady, 85
NJ. 235, 249, 426 A.2d 467, 474 (1981); State v. Schmid, 84 NJ. 535, 560, 423 A.2d
615, 628 (1980), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 100 (1982); State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 11213, 405 A.2d 368, 374-75 (1979); Peper v. Princeton University Board of Trustees, 77
N.J. 55, 79, 389 A.2d 465, 477 (1978); In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 19, 40-41, 51, 355
A.2d 647, 651-52, 662-63, 669, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); State v. Johnson, 68
NJ. 349, 353, 346 A.2d 66, 67-68 (1975); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 490, 303 A.2d
273, 282, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). See generally Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REv. 707 (1983); Brennan, supra note 103.
115 In his concurrence in State v. Hunt,Justice Handler identified seven criteria for
determining when to invoke the state constitution as an independent source for protecting individual rights. See generally 91 NJ. at 363-68, 450 A.2d at 965-67. Criteria
have since been adopted by the court. See, e.g., State v. Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 42,
678 A.2d 164, 181 (1996).
116 The state constitution's language may provide a basis for reaching a result different from that which could be obtained under federal law in either of two contexts.
First, the language of the state constitution may recognize rights not identified in the
federal Constitution, e.g. a right to education. See N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, par. 1; see
also generally Robinson v. Cahill, 62 NJ. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973). Second, the phrasing of a provision in the state constitution may be so significantly different from the
language in the federal counterpart that the Supreme Court "feel [s] free to interpret
our provision on an independent basis." Hunt, 91 N.J. at 364, 450 A.2d at 965. See also
Muhammad, 145 NJ. at 42, 678 A.2d at 181 (inclusion of Victim Rights Amendment in
NewJersey Constitution, art. 1, 4, precludes interpreting the state constitution from
barring victim impact evidence); State v. Schmid, 84 NJ. at 557, 423 A.2d at 626-27
(unique language of New Jersey's free speech clause, N.J. CONsT. art. 1, par. 6, indicated that provision was meant to be broader in scope than the First Amendment);
Right to Choose, 91 N.J. at 302-04, 450 A.2d at 932-33 (fundamental right to choose to
have an abortion is entitled to enhanced protection under NewJersey Constitution's
doctrine of equal protection found implicit in N.J. CONST. art. 1, par. 1); In re Grady,
85 N.J. 235, 250, 426 A.2d 467, 474 (1981) (recognizing individual rights involving
personal privacy under state constitution's bill of rights which protects the right of all
people to enjoy and pursue their individual well-being and happiness).
117 See, e.g., Schmid, 84 N.J. at 557, 423 A.2d at 626-27 (exploring the legislative history in determining that New Jersey's free speech clause was intended to be more
expansive than the First Amendment). See also Muhammad, 145 N.J. at 42, 678 A.2d at
181.
118 See, e.g., Schmid, 84 N.J. at 557, 423 A.2d at 626-27.
]
119 For example, "[t he United States Constitution is a grant of enumerated powers
to the federal government." Hun 91 N.J. at 365, 450 A.2d at 966. See also State v.
Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 225-26, 381 A.2d 333, 345 (1977) (Schreiber, J., concurring);
Gangemi v. Berry, 25 N.J. 1, 8-9, 134 A.2d 1, 5 (1957). In contrast, the NewJersey
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matters of particular state interest or local concern; 12 (6) the
state's history and traditions; 12 and (7) public attitudes. 122 All of

these criteria "share a common thread-that distinctive and identifiable attributes of a state government, its laws and its people justify
recourse to the state constitution as an independent source for rec2
ognizing and protecting individual rights."1 1

The New Jersey Supreme Court has been most willing to engage in an independent analysis under the state constitution and
provide broader protections than are available under the federal
Constitution "[w]hen particular questions are local in character
Constitution "serves only to limit the sovereign power which inheres directly in the
people and indirectly in their elected representatives." Hun4 91 N.J. at 365, 450 A.2d
at 966 (citing Schmid, 84 N.J. at 558, 423 A.2d at 62; Smith v. Penta, 81 N.J. 65, 74, 405
A.2d 350, 354 (1984); Gangemi 25 N.J. at 8-9, 134 A.2d at 5). Thus, the explicit affirmation of fundamental rights in the state constitution can be seen as a guarantee of
those rights rather than a restriction upon the State's authority to curtail them. See
Hunt, 91 N.J. at 366, 450 A.2d at 966; Schmid, 84 N.J. at 558, 423 A.2d at 627.
This distinction is apparent in the free speech context. While the First Amendment simply provides that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of
speech," U.S. CONST. amend. I, the New Jersey Constitution affirmatively guarantees
that "[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects." N.J. CONsT. art. 1, 1 6.
120 The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that certain matters are uniquely appropriate for independent state action. For example in Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 440 A.2d
1311 (1981), the court adopted a nile of standing to challenge searches and seizures
that is broader than the federal standard. See id. at 227, 440 A.2d at 1319. The court
"felt free to do so because that question implicated the management of our own court
system, which is of peculiarly local concern." Hunt 91 N.J. at 366, 450 A.2d at 966. It
also "reflected a strong state policy in favor of access to our courts and liberalized
standing to vindicate legal claims." Id. (citing Salorio v. Glaser, 82 N.J. 482, 490-91,
414 A.2d 943, 946-47 (1980); New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. New Jersey Elec.
Law Enforcement Comm'n, 82 N.J. 57, 67, 411 A.2d 168, 172-73 (1980); Home Builders League of South Jersey, Inc. v. Township of Berlin, 81 N.J. 127, 132, 405 A.2d 381,
384 (1979); Crescent Park Tenants Ass'n v. Realty Equities Corp., 58 N.J. 98, 107, 275
A.2d 433, 437-38 (1971)).
121 For example, in Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615, the New Jersey Supreme
Court found that New Jersey's history and traditions provided a basis for the independent application of the state constitution. See generally id. In holding that the
NewJersey Constitution provided greater protections for the right to free speech than
those found in the federal Constitution, the court emphasized the state's strong tradition of protecting individual expressional and associational rights. Id. at 562, 423
A.2d at 629-30. Similarly, in State v. Bellucci, 81 N.J. 531, 410 A.2d 666 (1979), the
New Jersey Supreme Court gave the state constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel more expansive protection than that found in the federal Constitution because of the state's firm policy regarding the proper role of attorneys in criminal
trials. See id. at 544, 410 A.2d at 672-73.
122 "Distinctive attitudes of a state's citizenry may also furnish grounds to expand
constitutional rights under state charters." Hunt, 91 N.J. at 367, 450 A.2d at 966 (Handler,J., concurring). See also Muhammad, 145 N.J. at 42, 678 A.2d at 164.
123 Hunt, 91 N.J. at 368, 450 A.2d at 967 (Handler, J., concurring).
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and do not appear to require a uniform national policy."1" 4 Then,
12 5
the court has held, "they are ripe for decision under state law."
Such an independent interpretation is especially appropriate
with respect to capital punishment, because this "is a matter of particular state interest or local concern and does not require a uniform national policy." 126 Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court
recently reiterated that "[w]ith respect to capital punishment in
particular . . . 'our state constitution provides an additional and,
where appropriate, more expansive source of protections against
the arbitrary and non-individualized imposition of the death penalty."1 2 7 Thus, the court in Ramseur specifically disapproved such
holdings as that of the Supreme Court in Pulley, writing:
...in recent years the United States Supreme Court has departed from the vigorous enforcement of these constitutional
principles [of protecting against the arbitrary and non-individualized imposition of the death penalty], particularlythe principle of
consistency. We are not obliged to follow the reasoning of all
these United States Supreme Court decisions in interpreting
our own state constitutional protections, nor do we intend to.12 8
Instead, the court recognized that "[i]n the context of the death
penalty, where the demands for fairness and accuracy are heightened, the principles of consistency and reliability rise to constitutional dimension." 2 9 Accordingly, in administering and
implementing the capital punishment statute in New Jersey, the
state high court has striven to ensure that there are "sufficient safeguards to prevent both arbitrary and nonindividualized infliction
of the death penalty, whether or not the United States Supreme
Court would require those safeguards under the federal Constitu124

Id. at 366, 450 A.2d at 966 (Handler, J., concurring).

125

Id.

State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 76, 549 A.2d 792, 810 (1988) (quoting Ramseur, 106
N.J. at 167, 524 A.2d at 209). See also California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013-14
(1983) (in capital cases, "States are free to provide greater protections in the criminal
justice system than the Federal Constitution requires.").
The United States Supreme Court has also recognized that "the primary responsibility for defining crimes against state law [and] fixing punishments for the commission of these crimes ...rests with the States." Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 824
(1991).
127 Muhammad, 1996 WL 354668, at *7 (quoting Koedatich, 112 NJ. 225, 251, 548
A.2d 939, 952 (1988) (quoting Ramseur, 106 NJ. at 190, 524 A.2d at 221)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Gerald, 113 N.J. at 76, 549 A.2d at 810-11 (concluding that Article 1, paragraph 12 of the state constitution "affords greater protections
to capital defendants than does the eighth amendment of the federal constitution").
128 106 N.J. at 190, 524 A.2d at 219 (emphasis added).
129 Id.
126
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tion." 3 ° The lack of meaningful proportionality review-as would
result if the restricted universe set forth in L. 1992, c. 5, were
used-inherently threatens the goals of consistency and reliability.13 1 The statute, as curtailed, therefore cannot pass constitutional muster.
Moreover, as scholars have established, in an article cited with
approval by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Ramseur,132 the conclusion that proportionality review is required by the New Jersey
Constitution is both consistent with. the fact that "the concept of
proportionality is rooted deeply in state law," and is supported by
"compelling public policy rationales," including that it "enables the
judiciary to provide for fundamental fairness in death penalty reviews in a way that best maintains the integrity of the state statutory
scheme and the entire criminal justice system."13 '
It follows that the concept of proportionality is a part of this
state's history and traditions. Indeed, proportionality was a governing principle underlying the adoption of the New Jersey Code
of Criminal Justice in 1978.134 This new Code enacted into law
"the prevailing theme.., that punishment should fit the offender
as well as the offense."13 5
The Code developed as a response to criticisms of the criminal
justice system that arose during the 1960s and 1970s, in both New
Jersey and throughout the United States. The most serious criticism was leveled at the arbitrary and capricious nature of criminal
sentencing.1 36 Many commentators "focused upon disparity in sentencing as the cruelest manifestation of a sentencing system bereft
13 7
of structure."
As a result, new models for sentencing arose in NewJersey and
in state legislatures throughout the country as well as in Congress.
These new approaches sought to achieve consistency and proporId.
See generally discussion supra at Part I.
See 106 N.J. at 327-28, 524 A.2d at 292-93.
Rodriguez et al., supra note 36, at 417, 423.
134 L. 1978, c. 95, codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-1, et seq (West 1995).
135 State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 345-46, 471 A.2d 370, 374-75 (1984) (quoting State v.
Ivan, 33 N.J. 197, 199-201, 162 A.2d 851, 852-53 (1960) (internal citations omitted)).
136 See Roth 95 N.J. at 347-48, 471 A.2d at 376-77 (citing FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE TwENTEmH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING 3 (1976); NORVAL MORIS, THE FuTuRE OF IMPRISONMENT 45 (1974); Marvin E.
Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing,41 U. CIN. L. Rv. 1, 54 (1972); Edward M. Kennedy,
Introduction: Symposium on Sentencing, 7 HOFsTRA L. REv. 1, 1 (1978)); see also Andrew
von Hirsch, Recent Trends in American Criminal Sentencing Theory, 42 MD. L. REv. 6
(1983); Thomas Weigend, Sentencing in West Germany, 42 MD.L. REv. 37 (1983).
137 Roth, 95 N.J. at 348, 471 A.2d at 377.
130
131
132
133
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tionality. California's Penal Code, for example, required that the
punishment be "proportionate to the seriousness of the offense
with provision for uniformity in the sentences of offenders committing the same offense under similar circumstances.""" Similarly,
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
proposed new standards. Its Model Sentencing and Corrections
Act of 1978 reported:
The current system results in large scale disparity in sentences
creating frustrations, tensions, and disrespect for the system in
both the offenders and the public-at-large.
The provisions of Article 3 reflect the use of "just desert" as the
overriding philosophy justifying the imposition of criminal sanctions. This philosophy requires that the nature and severity of
the sanction imposed to be deserved on the basis of the offense
committed and certain limited mitigating and aggravating factors relating to the offender. This seeks to avoid the injustice
that results from utilizing the other traditional purposes of
punishment. 139

Each of these reforms sought to make sentencing policy more rational and, in particular, to ensure that the punishment imposed
be proportionate with respect to the offense and the offender.
In line with this national trend, the New Jersey Legislature began efforts to recodify our state's criminal laws in 1968 and the
judiciary began to struggle with the establishment of sentencing
guidelines.140 A state-wide project conducted over two years by the
Administrative Office of the Courts was described as being "in response to a growing awareness of the need for greater equity in
sentencing, i.e., that similarly situated offenders should receive
similar sentences. Grave concerns had been expressed on a national basis, and in New Jersey, concerning undue sentencing
1005-1138 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (West 1983). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
1 to 1005-10-2 (Smith-Hurd 1982); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. ch. 9.94A (West Supp.
1983-84);
139

MINN. STAT.

§§ 244.09-244.11.

Roth, 95 NJ. at 350, 471 A.2d at 378 (quoting MODEL SENTENCING

AND CORREC-

ACT, Art. 3, Prefatory Note (1978), 10 U.L.A. 175-76 (Supp. 1983) (emphasis in
original)).
140 A commission was established, and in October 1971, the commission submitted
its final draft and report to the Governor and the legislature. See NEw JERSEY PENAL
TIONS

(2 vols.
1971). Assembly hearings took place in 1972, but then the matter languished in the
Legislature for several years. See generally Cameron H. Allen, Legislative History of the
CODE, FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY CRIMINAL LAW REvISION COMMISSION

NewJersey Code of CriminalJustice, 7 Cam. JusT.

Q. 31, 35 (1979).
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disparity." 14 1
In 1978, the New Jersey Legislature finally passed the Code of
Criminal Justice and Governor Byrne signed the new code into law.
Upon signing the new law, the Governor stated: "This Criminal
Code is intended to make sentencing more definitive .... It is
designed to reduce the possibility of one judge giving a stiff sentence and another a light sentence for similar crimes." 4 ' Thus, an
overriding purpose of the New Jersey Criminal Code is to ensure
that defendants who commit similar crimes receive similar punishment. In its structure, the New Jersey Criminal Code "closely resembles a 'model for sentencing based on notions of
proportionality and desert.'""' Specifically, the Code was structured to prevent "excessive, disproportionate or arbitrary
punishment.""'
In order to achieve these goals, the new Code established proportionality and appellate review procedures that would seek to
prevent disproportionate sentences. In State v. Roth,"' the New
Jersey Supreme Court identified "appellate review of sentences to
provide a greater degree of uniformity" as a central focus of sentencing reform."4 In a companion case, State v. Hodge, 1 4 7 the court
reaffirmed the principle that statutes establishing penalties "must
be construed 'so as to avoid the unfairness of arbitrary enforcement."" 4 8 In short, "the concepts of proportionality and fairness
permeate the sentencing provisions of the new code and contemporaneous judicial interpretations."' 4 9 The Code was viewed as a
"significant step[ ] . . . to make the criminal justice system fairer
and more equitable." 150 Consistent with this goal of ensuring fairness and proportionality in sentencing, the Capital Punishment
Act, enacted as an amendment to the Criminal Code in 1982, pro141

Roth, 95 N.J. at 353 n.3, 471 A.2d at 380 n.3 (quoting

REPORT OF THE SENTENC-

COURTS 1-2
(1979)).
142 Roth, 95 NJ. at 354, 471 A.2d at 381 (quoting Statement of Gov. Brendan T.
Byrne, Aug. 10, 1978).
143 Roth, 95 N.J. at 355, 471 A.2d at 381-82 (quoting Andrew von Hirsh, Utilitarian
Sentencing Resuscitated: The American Bar Association's Second Report on CriminalSentencing, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 772, 773 (1981).
144 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-2(b) (4) (West 1995).
145 95 N.J. 334, 471 A.2d 370 (1984).
146 Id. at 361, 471 A.2d at 385.
147 95 NJ. 369, 471 A.2d 389 (1984).
148 Id. at 374, 471 A.2d at 392 (quoting State v. Maguire, 84 NJ. 508, 514 n.6, 423
A.2d 294, 297 n.6 (1980)).
149 Rodriguez, et al., supra note 36, at 419.
150 Roth, 95 NJ. at 356, 471 A.2d at 382 (quoting Kennedy, supra note 136, at 8.
ING GUIDELINES PROJECT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
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vided for both appellate and proportionality review.'
Because the concept of proportionality is so deeply rooted in
this state's history and traditions,' 52 and was so guiding a force in
the creation of the new Criminal Code, the constitutionality of the
proportionality review provision of the Capital Punishment Act
should be analyzed independently under the New Jersey Constitution. Applying the Hunt criteria,' the NewJersey Constitution requires meaningful proportionality review of death sentences,
notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court's contrary interpretation of the federal constitution. As discussed above, the legislative history of the Capital Punishment Act, factor two of the Hunt
test, demonstrates that the Act, and indeed the entire Criminal
151

NJ.

STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3e. The statute provides.
Every judgment of conviction which results in a sentence of death
under this section shall be appealed... to the Supreme Court. Upon
the request of the defendant, the Supreme Court shall also determine
whether the sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases considering both the crime and the defendant.

Id.
152 A review to assess whether punishment is proportional has been conducted in a
wide range of contexts far beyond criminal sentencing. For example, in addressing
the question when public employees may be forced to forfeit their pensions on the
basis of misconduct, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Uricoli v. Police & Fire Retirement System, 91 N.J. 62, 449 A.2d 1267 (1982), held that a per se denial of all pension
rights would be too harsh. See id. at 77, 449 A.2d at 1275. Instead, the court stated,
"the proper approach to the resolution of the problem of what constitutes dishonorable service justifying the forfeiture of earned pension benefits is one which calls for
flexibility and the application of equitable considerations." Id.
Similarly, in determining the appropriate sanction for attorneys who are disciplined for ethical violations, the NewJersey Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that
"[t] he severity of discipline to be imposed must comport with the seriousness of the
ethical infractions in light of all the relevant circumstances." In re Nigohosian, 88
N.J. 308, 315, 442 A.2d 1007, 1010 (1982). Likewise, in the context of the revocation
of a medical doctor's license by the State Board of Medical Examiners the court has
held that "the test in reviewing administrative sanctions is 'whether such punishment
is so disproportionate to the offense, in light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness.'" In re Polk License Revocation, 90 N.J. 550, 578, 449
A.2d 7, 21 (1982) (quotation omitted).
In determining appropriate sanctions in a wide variety of contexts, then, the New
Jersey Supreme Court has frequently assessed whether a punishment is proportional
to the harm done. See generally In re Rogers, 126 N.J. 345, 359-60, 601 A.2d 198, 204
(1991); In rePoLk License Revocation, 90 N.J. at 578, 449 A.2d at 21. In doing so, moreover, the court has often considered the sanction imposed in similar cases. See In re
Rogers, 126 N.J. at 359-60, 601 A.2d at 204 (considering discipline imposed on attorneys in similar cases when determining the appropriate sanction to impose on the
case at bar); In re Polk License Revocation, 90 N.J. at 578-79, 449 A.2d at 21-22 (reviewing
other cases involving revocation of medical licenses as a sanction for sexually abusing
a patient); In re Barrett, 88 N.J. 450, 458-59, 443 A.2d 678, 682-83 (1982) (reviewing
attorney disciplinary sanctions in similar cases).
153 See 91 NJ. 338, 364-67, 450 A.2d 952, 965-67 (1982).
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Code, was created to ensure fairness and proportionality in sentencing and to rid this state's criminal justice system of arbitrary
punishment. For this reason, L. 1992, c. 5 should be analyzed with
greater scrutiny under the state constitution than it might be by
the United States Supreme Court under the federal Constitution,
to ensure that comports with these goals.
Similarly, an independent analysis is warranted under the state
constitution pursuant to the third Hunt factor: preexisting state
law. As originally enacted, the Capital Punishment Act required
proportionality review of all death sentences to ensure that this
most severe punishment was not imposed arbitrarily. With the
1992 amendment, and its constricted universe, the Act can no
longer serve this critical function. Because preexisting state law
sought to ensure even-handedness, however, a departure from the
United States Supreme Court's analysis under the federal Constitution is required.
Next, an independent and more protective analysis is warranted, under factor 5 of the Hunt criteria, because, as discussed
above, criminal justice in general,1 " and capital punishment in
particular, are matters of state interest and local concern. Finally,
as described above, New Jersey has a long-standing tradition of ensuring proportionality not only in criminal sentencing but in imposing sanctions in a broad range of contexts. The sixth Hunt
factor, state traditions, therefore also counsels in favor of reaching
a result under the New Jersey Constitution that departs from the
less protective result rendered by the United States Supreme Court
under the United States Constitution.
Applying the Hunt factors, then, the New Jersey Constitution
should be interpreted more broadly than its federal counterpart.
Notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court's holding to the
contrary, the NewJersey Supreme Court should hold that the New
Jersey Constitution requires meaningful proportionality review of
capital sentences. 155
154 See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995) ("States possess primary
authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law") (quoting Brecht v. Abramson,
507 U.S. 619 (1993); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982)).
155 For the reasons set forth above, the analysis of the Hunt factors in the context of
the proportionality review provision of the Capital Punishment Act differs from the
NewJersey Supreme Court's recent analysis of these factors with respect to the victim
impact statute at issue in Muhammad. In Muhammad, the court upheld the victim
impact statute based, in part, on the fact that "[i]n the New Jersey Constitution there
is a specific provision, namely, the Victim's Rights Amendment, that recognizes the
rights of victims." 1996 WL 354668, at *8. Indeed, were it not for this constitutional
amendment explicitly protecting the interests sought to be protected by the victim
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It is not surprising, then, that the court has previously indicated its fundamental agreement with the dissentingopinion in Pulley, an opinion that expressly characterized proportionality review
as constitutionally necessary. Thus, in Marshall, the court wrote:
The dissenting members in Pulley suggested not that in any
sense there be a requirement of generality of nearly unanimous
death verdicts for those convicted of the same crime, but rather
suggested only that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious
action, and have insisted that capital punishment be imposed
fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all. In their
view, proportionality review, although clearly no panacea, often
serves to identify the most extreme examples of disproportionality among similarly situated defendants.
That, we believe, is an acceptable understanding of the intentions of the framers of our Act-that statutory proportionality review should seek to ensure that the death penalty is being
administered in a rational, non-arbitrary, and evenhanded manner, fairly and with reasonable consistency. That review serves
as a means through which to monitor the imposition of death
sentences and thereby to prevent any156impermissible discrimination in imposing the death penalty.
Following the dissenting justices in Pulley, the New Jersey
Supreme Court, then, has defined proportionality review in a manner that renders it constitutionally necessary. "Proportionality review," the court has written, again quoting from the Pulley dissent,
"assists us in assuring that 'we have designed procedures which are
appropriate to the decision between life and death and ... [that]
we have followed those procedures.' 157 The dissent in Pulley con-

cluded that proportionality review was constitutionally required.
The NewJersey Supreme Court has signaled its fundamental agreement with that dissent.
Proportionality review is, therefore, an essential component of
impact statute, the court might have struck down the statute. See id. at *9 ("In the

absence of the Victim's Rights Amendment, we might have continued to hold that
victim impact evidence should not be admitted during the sentencing phase of a capital case."). No such countervailing constitutional provision exists in the context of
proportionality review.
156 State v. Marshall, 130 NJ. 109, 130-31, 613 A.2d 1059, 1069-70 (1992).
157 Ramseur, 106 NJ. at 326, 524 A.2d at 292 (quoting Pulley, 465 U.S. at 68-69
(Brennan and Marshall, J., dissenting)). The Ramseur court also relied upon the
Pul/ey dissent for the proposition that proportionality review plays an essential, constitutional function in assuring that death sentences are not "affected by impermissible
considerations." Ramseur, 106 NJ. at 327, 524 A.2d at 292 (quoting Pulley, 465 U.S. at
64 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting)).
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New Jersey's system of capital punishment, one which is required
by Article 1, paragraph 12 of the New Jersey Constitution of 1947.
L. 1992, c. 5, is unconstitutional because it renders that constitutionally mandated review utterly meaningless. By limiting proportionality review "to a comparison of similar cases in which a
sentence of death has been imposed," 58 the statute undermines
the ability of proportionality review to accomplish any of its constitutionally-mandated purposes.
Where a legislative curtailment thus renders a constitutional
right meaningless, the limitation itself is unconstitutional. 159 This
L. 1992, c. 5.
See, e.g., Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 NJ. 287, 308 n.6, 450 A.2d 925, 935 n.6
(1982) ("For many indigent women, the denial of Medicaid funds, as a practical matter, forecloses the option of obtaining a medically necessary abortion.... Only those
least able to bear the financial burden will be forced into childbirth at the expense of
their health. If the purpose of the statute is to protect potential life by depriving
indigent women of their right to protect their health, the statute, in that sense, is
rational. But it is that ruthless rationality that our Constitution will not condone.");
id. at 303-08, 450 A.2d at 933-37 ("In recent years .... a body of law has developed in
NewJersey acknowledging a woman's right to choose whether to carry a pregnancy to
full-term or to undergo an abortion .... In this case, however, the State admittedly
seeks to influence the decision between abortion and childbirth. Indeed, it concedes
that, for a woman who cannot afford either medical procedure, the statute skews the
decision in favor of childbirth at the expense of the mother's health.... Statutes such
as [this] 'can only be understood as an attempt to achieve with carrots what the government is forbidden to achieve with sticks.'") (quoting LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERiCAN
CONSTIrUTIONAL LAw § 15-10, at 933 n.77 (1978)); see also id. at 324, 450 A.2d at 944
(Pashman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The freedom to act is
meaningless if it is not coupled with the ability to effectively enjoy that freedom."); id.
("No 'meaningful opportunity' to choose can exist for poor women in the absence of
funding. '[F] or women eligible for Medicaid-poor women-denial of a Medicaidfunded abortion is equivalent to denial of legal abortion altogether.'") (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 338 (1980) (Marshall, J.,dissenting)); id. at 325, 450 A.2d
at 944-45 ("Poor women who cannot afford abortions simply cannot obtain them in
the absence of funding.... [T] he failure to fund abortion for the poor.., is tantamount to an absolute prohibition."); id. ("[I]t is ludicrous to assert that in the absence of funding, poor women who cannot afford abortions have the same freedom
to choose between abortion and childbirth as do women who can afford either option."); id. at 328, 450 A.2d at 946 ("The failure to fund abortions for women who
cannot afford them effectively deprives them of the freedom to choose."); Berman v.
Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 431-32, 404 A.2d 8, 14-15 (1979) ("[A] woman possesses a constitutional right to decide whether her fetus should be aborted ....
Public policy now
supports... the proposition that she not be impermissibly denied a meaningful opportunity to make that decision."); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374, 380-81
(1971) (Court invalidated requirement of payment of court fees and costs that restricted ability of indigent people to get a divorce reasoning that "the right to due
process reflects a fundamental value in our American constitutional system," and the
denial of access to the courts effectively denied poor persons the meaningful 'opportunity' to obtain a divorce.); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 462 (1977) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("The Court concedes the existence of a constitutional right but denies
the realization and enjoyment of that right on the ground that existence and realiza158
159
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is true because, "a theoretical right is of no use to a real person."16 °
In recognition of this principle, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
has held that unlike the United States Constitution, provisions enshrined in the state constitution often require affirmative conduct-not merely the absence of interference-on the part of the
meaningful realization of
government to effectuate an individual's
161
his or her constitutional rights.

Moreover, the responsibility for defining and preserving the
guarantees of the state constitution is entrusted exclusively to the
judiciary. "lIT] he judicial obligation to protect the fundamental
rights of individuals is as old as the country."162 As the NewJersey
Supreme Court has explained: "The judicial branch of the government has imposed upon it the obligation of interpreting the Constitution and of safeguarding the basic rights guaranteed thereby to
the people .... However delicate that duty may be, we are not at

liberty to surrender, or to ignore, or to waive it."163
Thus, the legislature may not enact a law, such as L. 1992, c. 5,
that curtails the constitutional right to proportionality review and
renders that right meaningless. Where a procedural rule, such as
the proportionality review mechanism, is of constitutional dimention are separate and distinct... . I find that disingenuous and alarming, almost
reminiscent of: 'Let them eat cake.'").
160 Right to Choose, 91 N.J. at 327, 450 A.2d at 946 (Pashman, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). See also New Jersey Coalition v.J.M.B., 138 N.J. 326, 370, 650
A.2d 757, 779 (1994) (finding that for the right to free speech under the NewJersey
Constitution to have meaning, it must protect leafletting in private shopping malls
because malls have replaced downtown public streets: "If free speech is to mean anything in the future, it must be exercised at these [shopping] centers. Our constitutional right encompasses more than leafletting and associated speech on sidewalks
located in empty downtown business districts. It means communicating with the people in the new commercial and social centers; if the people have left for the shopping
centers, our constitutional right includes the right to go there too, to follow them,
and to talk to them.").
161 See, e.g., NewJersey Coalition, 138 N.J. at 353, 650 A.2d at 770 ("We thus held that
Article 1, paragraph 6 of our State Constitution granted substantive free speech
rights, and that unlike the First Amendment, those rights were not limited to protection from government interference. In effect, we found that the reach of our constitutional provision was affirmative.").
162 King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 177, 330 A.2d 1, 10 (1974).
163 Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 33 N.J. 1, 12, 161 A.2d 705, 710 (1960); see
also Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 133, 147, 351 A.2d 713, 720 (1975) (same); State v.
Hunt, 91 N.J. 287, 358, 450 A.2d 952, 962 (1982) ("The NewJersey Constitution provides the citizens of this state with a fully independent source of protection of fundamental rights and liberties. It is our role alone to say what those rights are, and it is
our solemn obligation to enforce them."); State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 157, 519
A.2d 820, 856 ("In our tripartite system of separate governmental powers, the primary
responsibility for [the] preservation" of constitutional principles "is that of the
judiciary.").
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in
sion, the legislature lacks authority to revoke or restrict that rule 164
above,
discussed
As
utility.
its
such a way as to undermine
proportionality review is indispensable to the protection of the
constitutional rights of capital defendants and therefore is a rule
of constitutional dimension. Because L. 1992, c. 5, eviscerates
meaningful proportionality review, 1 61 the amendment is
unconstitutional.

166

III.

Although the Supreme Court of the United States held in Pulley v. Harris that proportionality review is not required by the
United States Constitution in all cases,16 7 the Court also made clear
that proportionality review would be required in "a capital sentencing system so lacking in other checks on arbitrariness that it would
not pass constitutional muster without comparative proportionality
review." 16 8 Thus, even if proportionality review-and therefore
meaningful proportionality review-is not required by the New
Jersey Constitution,1 69 the provision limiting such review may be
unconstitutional, or may render New Jersey's Capital Punishment
Act unconstitutional, if it leaves the appellate review provisions of
See discussion supra at Part I.
See discussion supra at Part I.
166 See Novembrino, 105 N.J. at 157-58 n.39, 519 A.2d at 856 n.39. In Novembrino, the
New Jersey Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule, precluding the admission
of evidence obtained illegally by the state, was a rule of constitutional dimension. As
the court described, the exclusionary rule "serves as the indispensable mechanism for
vindicating the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches," and it is
therefore an integral part of the state constitution. Id. at 157, 519 A.2d at 856. In the
same way, because meaningful proportionality review is an indispensable mechanism
for vindicating the constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment-by ensuring that the death penalty is not imposed arbitrarily or disproportionately in one case as compared to other cases-proportionality review is an integral
part of the state constitution. As such, the legislature is not free to constrict this
review procedure in such a manner as to leave it impotent to serve its constitutionally
required goal.
In other words, in Novembrino, the court held that the legislature has no authority
to abolish or modify the exclusionary rule by enacting a statute that allows illegally
obtained evidence to be admitted at a criminal trial because if the legislature annulled the exclusionary rule, it would indirectly abrogate the constitutional right protected by the rule, and the legislature clearly lacks authority to derogate constitutional
guarantees. See id. at 156-58, 519 A.2d at 855-57; see also Robinson, 69 N.J. at 147, 351
A.2d at 720. The same reasoning applies to proportionality review: because such
review is an integral part of the constitutional rights of capital defendants, it cannot
be abolished--or eviscerated-by statute.
167 465 U.S. 37, 50 (1984).
168 Id. at 51.
169 See generally supra discussion at Point II.
164
165
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the Act constitutionally deficient. In this section, we argue that
that is precisely the effect of L. 1992, c. 5.
The Supreme Court of the United States has "emphasized repeatedly the crucial role of meaningful appellate review in ensuring that the death penalty is not imposed arbitrarily or
irrationally."1 7 0 Indeed, in Gregg, Proffitt, andJurek-the first three
cases following Furman in which the Supreme Court found the
death penalty constitutional-the Court upheld the capital sentencing schemes of Georgia, Florida, and Texas, respectively, in
large part because those states' statutes required in-depth appellate
review of every death sentence. In Gregg, the Court held:
As an important additional safeguard against arbitrariness and
caprice, the Georgia statutory scheme provides for automatic appeal of all death sentences to the State's Supreme Court. That
court is required by statute to review each sentence of death and
determine whether it was imposed under the influence of passion or prejudice, whether the evidence supports the jury's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance, and whether the
sentence is disproportionate
compared to those sentences im17 1
posed in similar cases.
Similarly, the provision of thorough appellate review was a significant factor in the Court's decisions upholding the capital sentenc72
ing schemes of Florida and Texas.1
Following these three decisions, in Zant v. Stephens,' 73 the
United States Supreme Court reiterated the importance of appellate review to the constitutionality of a death sentencing scheme.
The Court observed that the appellate review of every death penalty proceeding "to determine whether the sentence was arbitrary
or disproportionate" was one of the two primary features upon
which the Court's approval of the Georgia scheme in Gregg had
rested. 7 4 In reaffirming the validity of the Georgia statute, the
170 Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 321 (1991); see also Clemons v. Mississippi, 494
U.S. 738, 749 (1990); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204-06 (1976); Profitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242, 253 (1976);Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976).
171 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198.
172 See Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 253 (risk of arbitrary or capricious infliction of death
penalty "is minimized by Florida's appellate review system, under which the evidence
of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances is reviewed and reweighed by the
Supreme Court of Florida 'to determine independently whether the imposition of the
ultimate penalty is warranted'") (quotation omitted); Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276 ("By providing prompt judicial review of the jury's decision in a court with statewide jurisdiction, Texas has provided a means to promote the evenhanded, rational, and
consistent imposition of death sentences under law.").
173 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
174 Id. at 877.
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Court found the appellate review
process central to its holding that
75
the statute was constitutional.
More recently, in Parker v. Dugger,1 76 the Court reversed a
death sentence in part because the Florida Supreme Court had
failed to conduct the meaningful appellate review required by the
Constitution. The Court held that the state court's affirmance of
the death sentence "neither based on a review of the individual
record in the case nor in reliance on the trial judge's findings
based on that record," 177 rendered the sentence unconstitutionally
arbitrary in violation of the Eighth Amendment. A death sentence
that is not subject to meaningful appellate review, the Court held,
cannot survive constitutional scrutiny. Thus, the Supreme Court of
the United States has made clear that for a capital punishment system to be constitutional,
"some form of meaningful appellate re178

view is required."
Proportionality review provides such a meaningful form of appellate review. In Gregg,179 the Supreme Court explicitly relied on
this feature of the Georgia capital-sentencing system to find the
scheme constitutional. "The provision for appellate review in the
Georgia capital-sentencing system serves as a check against the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. In particular,

the proportionality review substantially eliminates the possibility
that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant
jury."180

The NewJersey Supreme Court, too, has held that meaningful

appellate review is a constitutionally-required component of a
death penalty statute. 81 Further, it has recognized that proportionality review "allows the Court to monitor the results ofjury discretion," and thereby "permits New Jersey's capital-sentencing
scheme to comply with the dictates of Furman and with the Eighth
175 Id. at 876-77; see also Pulley, 465 U.S. at 58 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("While the
Court [in Zant] did not focus on the comparative review element of the scheme in
reaffirming the constitutionality of the Georgia statute, appellate review of the sentencing decision was essential to upholding its constitutionality.") (emphasis added).
176 498 U.S. 308, 321-23 (1991).
177 Id. at 321.
178 Pulley, 465 U.S. at 45; see also id. at 59 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("some form of
meaningful appellate review is an essential safeguard against the arbitrary and capricious imposition of death sentences by individual juries and judges"); Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 169 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from dismissal of writ of
certiorari) (noting the importance of appellate review in Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence).
179 428 U.S. at 206.
180 Id.
181 See, e.g., State v. Martini, 1996 WL 35461, at *6.
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Amendment, which prohibit arbitrary and inconsistent application
of the death penalty."182 Indeed, in Ramseur, the Court relied on
the proportionality review mechanism, as part of the appellate review procedure under the Capital Punishment Act, to find the Act
constitutional under the Eighth Amendment, noting, "[It] his Court
not only has mandatory appellate review, but also the authorization
to conduct proportionality review upon the defendant's request." 18 3 Thus, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, following the
Supreme Court of the United States, has held that a death sentencing scheme must contain meaningful appellate review and that the
proportionality review provided by the New184
Jersey Capital Punishment Act plays this vital role in the system.
In Pulley,185 the United States Supreme Court held that the
absence of proportionality review in the California capital punishment system did not render that scheme unconstitutional. The
Court did so, however, only after finding that California's system
provided other safeguards against arbitrariness. For example, the
Court found that the California death penalty statute required the
trial judge to review every jury verdict of death, including performing a complete review of the evidence and making an "independent determination as to whether the weight of the evidence
supports the jury's findings and verdicts;" 186 it also required that
the court state on the record the reasons for its findings.18 7 The
Supreme Court further found that under the California system, the
trial court's review was followed by mandatory appellate review of
the evidence relied upon by the court, thus "assur[ing] thoughtful
and effective appellate review, focusing upon the circumstances
present in each particular case."18 These additional procedural
safeguards rendered California's capital-punishment system constitutional notwithstanding the absence of proportionality review.
The Court acknowledged, however, that "there could be a capital
sentencing system so lacking in other checks on arbitrariness that it
would not pass constitutional muster without comparative proportionality review.""8 9
In contrast to California's extensive appellate review proceState v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3, 21, 651 A.2d 949, 957 (1994).
106 N.J. 123, 186, 190, 524 A.2d 188, 219, 221 (1987).
184 Id.
185 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
186 Id. at 52-53 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 190.4(e) (West Supp. 1983)).
187 Id.
188 Id. at 53 (quoting People v. Frierson, 599 P.2d 587, 609 (Cal. 1979)).
189 Id. at 51.
182
183
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dures, the New Jersey Capital Punishment Act requires no special
appellate safeguards other than proportionality review. The Act is
silent with respect to the substance of an appeal other than to require that "[e]very judgment of conviction which results in a sentence of death under this section shall be appealed, pursuant to
the Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court.""' ° Indeed, NewJersey
is the only state among all those conducting proportionality review
that does not require more extensive appellate review. New
Jersey's statute requires only that "[u]pon the request of the defendant, the Supreme Court shall also determine whether the sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant." 9 1 In contrast,
every other state mandating proportionality review requires addi19 2
tional findings to be made in the course of appellate review.
For example, Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee and Washington all require independent
fact-finding by the Supreme Court to determine whether the evidence supports the judge or jury's finding of aggravating or other
circumstances. 19' Some of these states also require the independ194
ent weighing or reweighing of factors.
In addition, virtually every state that mandates proportionality
review also requires the appellate court to determine whether the
sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.1 5 Finally, the majority of
190 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3e (West 1995).

Id.
In addition, some states that are not required by statute to conduct proportionality review nonetheless perform such review along with other appellate review safeguards. See, e.g., State v. Richmond, 560 P.2d 41, 50-51 (Ariz. 1977); Brown v.
Wainwright, 392 So. 2d 1327, 1331 (Fla. 1981).
193 See ALA.CODE § 13A-5-53(a); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46b; DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 4 2 0 9 (g) (2); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35; Ky. REV. STAT. § 532.075(3), (5); LA.
CODE CmaM. PRoc. ANN. art. 905.9.1 (Supreme Court Rule 28); Miss. CODE ANN. § 9919-105(3), (5); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.035; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-310; N.H. R~v.
STAT. ANN. § 630:5; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d) (2);
OHIO REV. CODE § 2929.05(A); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(h); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-25(C), (E); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-27A-12; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13206(C) (1); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.130(2).
194 See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-53(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(g) (2); OHIO REv.
CODE § 2929.05(A); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-206(C) (1).
195 See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-53(a); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46b; DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 4 2 09(g) (2); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35; Ky. REv. STAT. § 532.075(3), (5); LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.9.1 (Supreme Court Rule 28); Miss. CODE ANN. § 9919-105(3), (5); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.035; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-310; N.H. REv.
191
192
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states also require consideration of whether the death sentence is
196
excessive.
New Jersey's capital sentencing scheme, unlike the states discussed above, contains no appellate review safeguards whatsoever:
it does not require independent fact-finding or weighing of factors;
it does not require a determination of whether the sentence of
death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or
other arbitrary factors; and it does not require consideration of
whether the death sentence was excessive. For this reason, proportionality review is essential to the constitutionality of the NewJersey
Capital Punishment Act under the Eighth Amendment and PulLey 97 Indeed, other states, considering the role of proportionality
review as part of their death penalty systems, have concluded that
those schemes could withstand constitutional scrutiny under the
federal Constitution without proportionality review only because of
the existence of such other appellate review safeguards. The
Supreme Court of Louisiana reasoned:
The Supreme Court of the United States in Pulley v. Harris,held
that the Eighth Amendment does not necessarily require a capital sentencing system to include a provision for the appellate
court to compare the sentence in the case under review with the
penalties imposed in similar cases. The principal constitutional
consideration is that the overall system contain sufficient checks
and safeguards against the arbitrary imposition of capital
punishment.
Thus, while some sort of proportionality review is desirable
(and is arguably necessary to maintain the constitutionality of
some capital sentencing schemes) as part of an automatic appellate review, the exact role of proportionality review varies from
state to state in relation to the variations 198
in the overall capital
sentencing scheme of the particular state.
The court concluded that "the present Louisiana capital sentencANN. § 630:5 XI; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A2000(d)(2); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(h); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25(C), (E);
STAT.

S.D.

CODIFIED LAWS ANN.

CODE §

17-110.1C;

§ 23A-27A-12; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-206(C) (1);
§ 10.95.130(2).

VA.

WASH. REv. CODE ANN.

196 See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-53(a); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46b; GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-10-35; Ky. REv. STAT. § 532.075(3), (5); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-105(3), (5); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 565.035; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-310; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 XI;
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(2); OHiO REv. CODE
§ 2929.05(A); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(h); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25(C), (E);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-12; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-206(C) (1); VA.
CODE § 17-110.1C; WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.95.130(2).
197 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
198 State v. Welcome, 458 So. 2d 1235, 1248-49 (La. 1983).

1462

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:1423

ing system contains so many safeguards and checks on arbitrariness, in comparison to other states, that a comparative
proportionality review clearly is not constitutionally required.""9
Similarly, the Attorney General of Idaho, in an Opinion concerning whether deleting proportionality review from that state's
capital punishment act would be constitutional under the Eighth
Amendment, relied largely on the existence of other appellate review safeguards as a basis for finding that proportionality review
was not constitutionally mandated. 200 Based in part on these additional appellate requirements, the Idaho Attorney General
concluded:
Comparative proportionality as mandated by Idaho Code § 192827 is not required by the United States Constitution. Idaho's
capital scheme without proportionality would still adequately
channel a judge's discretion at sentencing... [and] the Idaho
Supreme Court would still be mandated to determine whether
1) the sentence was the result of passion, prejudice or any other
arbitrary factor; 2) whether the evidence supports the finding of
an aggravating factor; and 3) whether the sentence is
20
excessive. '
The existence of these additional appellate review requirements,
then, provides a means to ensure the evenhanded and consistent
imposition of the death penalty and saves Idaho's capital punishment scheme from constitutional infirmity. Because New Jersey
has none of these additional appellate safeguards, proportionality
review is essential to render the Act constitutional.
More significantly, perhaps, with the passage of L. 1992, c. 5,
New Jersey has become the only state to legislate a universe for
proportionality review restricted to "a comparison of similar cases
in which a sentence of death has been imposed." 2 2 Indeed, the
vast majority of states that conduct proportionality review use a
broader universe. Many states include in the universe all deatheligible cases, whether or not they advanced to a penalty-phase
hearing. For example, in Pennsylvania, the supreme court "conducts an independent evaluation of all cases of murder of the first
degree convictions which were prosecuted or could have been
prosecuted.... 2 03 Similarly, in Georgia, the supreme court "com199
200
201
202
203

Id. at 1252.

1993 Idaho Op. Atty. Gen. No. 93-12 (1993).
Id. at 3 (citing IDAio CODE § 19-2827).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3e.
Commonwealth v. Frey, 475 A.2d 700, 707 (Pa.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 963
(1984). See also Commonwealth v. Pursell, 495 A.2d 183, 197-98 (Pa. 1985) (propor-
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pare [s] cases as to which the death penalty could have been sought
by the prosecutor but was not."204 In Washington, the pool of similar cases for proportionality review consists of all cases in which a
person was convicted of aggravated first degree murder "including
the majority of cases which death is either not sought or not imposed."2" 5 Similarly, in Nebraska the universe is determined on a
case by case basis, looking6 to all homicides in which the death sen20
tence was "authorized."
Several other states conduct proportionality review by comparing cases that have proceeded to the penalty phase, whether the
sentence imposed was life or death. For example, Connecticut includes in the class of similar cases, "cases in which the conviction of
a capital felony after trial was followed by a hearing to consider the
imposition of the death penalty."20 7 Similarly, the Virginia
Supreme Court, in conducting its proportionality review, compares
the sentence with capital murder cases in which the death penalty
was imposed "as well as capital cases resulting in life imprison20 9
ment."20 8 Other states are in accord.
tionality review conducted by comparison with other first-degree murder cases in
which evidence could support an aggravating factor).
204 Horton v. State, 295 S.E.2d 281, 289 n.9 (Ga. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1188
(1983). See also Castell v. State, 301 S.E.2d 234, 250 and n.12 (Ga. 1983) (employing
such a universe).
205 State v. Pirtle, 904 P.2d 246, 276 (Wash. 1995). See also State v. Benn, 845 P.2d
289, 316 (Wash. 1993) (pool includes "those cases in which the death penalty was
sought and those in which it was not"); State v. Rupe, 743 P.2d 210 (Wash. 1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1061 (1988) (same).
206 State v. Williams, 287 N.W.2d 18, 28-29 (Neb. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891
(1980). See also State v. Moore, 316 N.W.2d 33, 44 (Neb.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984
(1982) (proportionality review includes comparison with all other first-degree murder
convictions).
207 State v. Ross, 624 A.2d 886 (Conn. 1993) (citing CONNE Cricu-r PRACTICE BOOK
§ 4066A(b) which limits comparison cases to those proceeding to death penalty
phase, "unless the court, on application of a party claiming that the resulting pool of
eligible cases is inadequate for disproportionality review, shall modify this limitation
in a particular case").
208 Murphy v. Commonwealth, 431 S.E.2d 48, 54 (Va.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 336
(1993)
209 See, e.g., State v. Ortiz, 639 P.2d 1020, 1031-32 (Ariz.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984
(1982); Whitmore v. State 756 S.W.2d 890, 895 (Ark. 1988); Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d
104, 138-39 (Del.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983); State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 8
(Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974); State v. Bates, 495 So. 2d 1262, 1277 (La.
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1042 (1987); State v. Brogdon, 457 So. 2d 616 (La. 1984);
State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 515 (Mo. 1992); State v. McIlvoy, 629 S.W.2d 333,
334-42 (Mo. 1982); State v. Kills on Top, 793 P.2d 1273, 1308 (Mont. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1259 (1991); State v. Coleman, 605 P.2d 1000 (Mont. 1979); Petrocelli
v. State, 692 P.2d 503, 511 (Nev. 1985); State v. Clark, 772 P.2d 322 (N.M.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 923 (1989); State v. Garcia, 664 P.2d 969 (N.M.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1112
(1983); State v. McCollum, 433 S.E.2d 144, 161-64 (N.C. 1993); State v. McHone, 435
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Furthermore, even those states that purport to use a universe
limited to only death-sentenced cases will in fact consider additional cases, such as those of co-defendants who were not sentenced to death.2 10 Some permit an expansion of the universe
upon application of the defendant. 2 11 New Jersey's L. 1992, c. 5,
unlike these states, prohibits the court from considering any cases
has been
other than "similar cases in which a sentence of death
2 12
defendant.
the
of
request
the
at
even
.,"
.
imposed .
S.E.2d 296, 307 (N.C. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1577 (1994); State v. Harris, 839
S.W.2d 54, 77 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1368 (1993); Boggs v. Commonwealth, 331 S.E.2d 407 (Va. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031 (1986); Whitley v. Commonwealth, 286 S.E.2d 162 (Va.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982).
210 See, e.g., Beck v. State, 396 So. 2d 645, 664 (Ala.), rev'd on other grounds, 447 U.S.
625 (1980) (court may examine "penalty imposed upon the defendant in relation to
that imposed upon his accomplices"); People v. Bean, 560 N.E.2d 258, 289 (111. 1990)
(although proportionality review is not required, Court compares death sentences to
sentences imposed upon co-defendants or accomplices); People v. Jimerson, 535
N.E.2d 889, 906-907 (11. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1031 (1990) (same); Johnson v.
State, 477 So. 2d 196 (Miss. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1109 (1986) (comparing death
sentence imposed on a defendant to the life sentences imposed on accomplices).
211 See, e.g., Ross, 624 A.2d at 886-87 (allowing, upon application of the defendant,
the universe of cases to be expanded beyond penalty trial cases) (citing CONNECrctur
PRAcricE BooK, § 4066(b) which limits comparison cases to those proceeding to
death penalty phase, "unless the court, on application of a party claiming that the
resulting pool of eligible cases is inadequate for disproportionality review, shall modify this limitation in a particular case"); Tichnell v. State, 468 A.2d 1, 18 (Md. 1983)
(holding that universe consists of cases in which the state sought the death penalty,
but writing, but writing "[i]n so concluding, we do not preclude any defendant whose
death sentence is under appellate review from presenting argument with relevant
facts, that designated non-capital murder cases are similar to the case then under
scrutiny and should be taken into account in the exercise of the proportionality review decision"); Moore, 316 N.W.2d at 44 (Although the Nebraska Supreme Court has
limited the universe of cases for proportionality review, the trial courts, which initially
address the issue of proportionality, will consider any first degree homicide cases introduced by either party).
212 By its terms, then, the statute precludes the New Jersey Supreme Court from
considering mitigating evidence in the proportionality review context. This prohibition violates the well-established rule of both the United States and New Jersey
Supreme Courts that a sentencer may "not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death." Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 317 (1989) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 604 (1978)) (emphasis in original); see also Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S.
164, 184 (1988) (O'Connor, J. concurring in judgment); Sussmer v. Shuman, 483
U.S. 66, 75-76 (1987); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J.
concurring); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that "a death
penalty law may not provide for the exclusion of any mitigating evidence concerning
the defendant's character or record or the circumstances of the offense." State v.
Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 185, 524 A.2d 188, 218 (1987) (citing Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604);
State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 503, 645 A.2d 734, 770 (1994); State v. Marshall, 123
N.J. 1, 150, 613 A.2d 1059, 1079-80 (1992); State v. Gerald, 113 NJ. 40, 103, 549 A.2d
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Indeed, only three states-Ohio, Kentucky, and South Carolina-limit their proportionality review to a comparison with other
cases in which the death penalty has been imposed. Unlike New
Jersey, however, these jurisdictions require other appellate action
to ensure that the death penalty is not imposed arbitrarily. In
Ohio, for example, if ajury recommends a death sentence, a single
judge or panel of three judges reconsiders and reweighs all the
evidence and factors, and death may be imposed only if it is again
unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors.2 13 After these two
levels of de novo review, both an intermediate appellate court and
the Ohio Supreme Court "review and independently weigh all of
the facts and other evidence disclosed in the record" to determine
whether the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors,
evaluate the evidence to determine if it supports the finding of the
792, 825 (1988); State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 156, 548 A.2d 887, 903 (1988). Relevant
mitigating evidence must not be precluded because "[a] sentencing procedure ...
may not expose a defendant to 'the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in
spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty."' Bey, 112 N.J. at 157, 548 A.2d
at 903 (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605). The court has thus recognized that "'the
defendant [must] be granted wide leeway in presenting evidence in mitigation of the
death penalty." Id. In sum, to withstand federal and state constitutional scrutiny, a
capital punishment system must not preclude consideration of any relevant mitigating
evidence.
The New Jersey Capital Punishment Act, as amended by L. 1992, c. 5, cannot
withstand such scrutiny because it precludes consideration, during proportionality review, of cases in which the death sentence was not imposed. In the context of proportionality review, cases that are similar to the case before the court in which the death
penalty was not imposed clearly amount to mitigating evidence. These cases are necessary to show that "the sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(e) (West 1995); see also Marshal4 130 N.J. at 131, 613
A.2d at 1070 ("A death sentence is comparatively excessive if other defendants with
similar characteristics generally receive sentences other than death for committing
factually similar offenses in the same jurisdiction") (citing Tichne, 468 A.2d at 17
n.18); Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 343, 645 A.2d 685, 689 (1994) (same); State v. Martini, 139
N.J. 3, 20, 651 A.2d 949, 957 (1994) (same); DiFrisco, 142 N.J. at 160, 662 A.2d at 448
(same). Thus, a comparison with these cases provides "a basis for a sentence less than
death." Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604.
Because it absolutely precludes introduction of the mitigating evidence, L. 1992,
c. 5, unlike the victim impact statute at issue in Muhammad, contravenes the principles
set forth in Lockett, and thus violates the federal and state constitutions. In Muhammad, the New Jersey Supreme Court reiterated that "Lockett... held that a defendant
has a right to present any relevant mitigating evidence in support of a sentence less
that death." 1996 WL 354668, at *6. The court distinguished the victim impact statute, however, holding that "[t]he victim impact statute does not prohibit the introduction of any mitigating evidence." Id. Unlike the victim impact statute, however, L.
1992, c. 5 does prohibit the introduction of mitigating evidence; it bars defendants
from presenting and the court from considering any cases in which the death penalty
could have been but was not imposed. L. 1992, c. 5 is therefore unconstitutional.
213 OHio REv. CODE § 2929.03(D) (3).
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aggravating circumstances found below, and make a determination
as to whether the sentencing court properly weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors. 1 4 Similarly, in Kentucky and South
Carolina, the supreme court must determine "whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor" and "whether the evidence
supports the jury's or judge's finding of a statutory aggravating
circumstance.

2 15

The New Jersey Capital Punishment Act does not require any
such additional review. Thus, New Jersey now joins a minority of
states in restricting the universe of cases for comparison to those in
which the death penalty has been imposed. In addition, however,
New Jersey further limits review by failing to provide any other appellate safeguards. New Jersey, then, stands alone in providing
such limited appellate review of death sentences. The extreme rarreview in itself suggests the unconity of a system with such limited
2 16
stitutionality of the scheme.
More importantly, without additional appellate review procedures, proportionality review provides the only mechanism under
the NewJersey capital punishment scheme to safeguard against the
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. By restricting the universe of cases for comparison to those in which the death penalty
has been imposed, however, New Jersey cannot provide meaningful proportionality review.2 17 The New Jersey Capital Punishment
Act, as amended by L. 1992, c. 5, therefore, fails to provide any
meaningful appellate review. Because New Jersey's death sentencing scheme does not contain other appellate safeguards to serve as
214 OHio REV. CODE § 2929.05(A). See also State v. Williams, 660 N.E.2d 724 (Ohio
1996) (court of appeals has authority to reweigh evidence); State v. Simko, 644 N.E.2d
345 (Ohio 1994), reconsideration denied, 644 N.E.2d 1389, cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 103
(1995) (supreme court independently weighs aggravating and mitigating factors);
State v. Sowell, 530 N.E.2d 1294 (Ohio 1988) (describing appellate review procedures); State v. Thompson, 514 N.E.2d 407, 420-21 (Ohio 1987) (reversing death sentence on ground that prosecutor's prejudicial argument at sentencing may have
prevented jury from dispassionately weighing aggravating and mitigating factors).
215 Ky. REv. STAT. § 532.075(3); Bussell v. Commonwealth, 882 S.W.2d 111, 116 (Ky.
1994); Sanborne v. Commonwealth, 892 S.W.2d 542, 556 (Ky. 1994); S.C. CODE ANN.
16-3-25(C); State v. Bell, 406 S.E.2d 165, 171 (S.C. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 888
(1992).
216 Cf Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788-96 (1982) (finding unconstitutional
Florida's death penalty for felony murder in part because only eight of 36 jurisdictions authorized death for such a crime); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-97
(1977) (striking down Georgia's provision for death penalty for rape of adult woman
in part because Georgia was only state with such a provision).
217 See discussion supra at Part I.
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"checks on arbitrariness," 2 18 the eradication of meaningful proportionality review by limiting the universe to death-sentenced cases
only, renders the Capital Punishment Act invalid under the United
States Constitution. Additionally, because the absence of meaningful proportionality review leaves the constitutional functions of
such review unfulfilled, 2 19 the Act is unconstitutional under Article
1, paragraph 12 of the NewJersey Constitution, which, as discussed
above, is interpreted more expansively than is the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 2 °
CONCLUSION

Proportionality review following the affirmance of a sentence
of death has been incorporated in the New Jersey Capital Punishment Act in order to ensure that society's most severe sanction is in
fact being reserved by prosecutors and jurors for the worst
criminals and the most heinous crimes. It has also been delegated
the essential role of insuring that the death penalty is not sought or
imposed arbitrarily or based upon impermissible factors such as
race, gender, mental illness, or geography. A comprehensive
methodology to accomplish these goals has been developed.
Those goals, which are of constitutional magnitude in New
Jersey, cannot be accomplished and that methodology cannot be
used if the Supreme Court of NewJersey considers only those cases
in which a death sentence was imposed, as mandated by the 1992
amendment to the Capital Punishment Act, L. 1992, c. 5. In essence, that amendment renders proportionality review a meaningless enterprise, capable of serving neither society's interest in the
fair and unbiased application of the death penalty nor a defendant's interest in not being arbitrarily or inappropriately selected for
execution.
The 1992 amendment to the Capital Punishment Act is more
than merely bad policy. It also violates the NewJersey Constitution
which has been interpreted more broadly than its federal counterpart in numerous respects, including the death penalty. Application of L. 1992, c. 5, will topple the state constitutional foundation
upon which the validity of the Capital Punishment Act is built. It
will weaken the appellate review provisions of the Act to such an
extent that it will become the least protective death penalty statute
in the nation, and so unable to assure due process that it will run
218 Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 51 (1984).
219 See discussion supra at Part I.
220 See discussion supra at Part II.
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afoul of both the state and federal constitutions. And it will leave
New Jersey's citizens uniquely exposed to capital punishment, even
when that sanction ought not be imposed. No less than our society's willingness to tolerate this supreme injustice is on the line: in
order to prevent it, we must save the universe of cases necessary to
perform meaningful proportionality review.

